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The Supreme Court's New Public-Private
Distinction Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause: Avoiding the Traditional Versus
Nontraditional Classification Trap
by BRADFORD MANK *
Introduction
In its 2007 decision United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, the Supreme Court for
the first time held the "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine
("DCCD") allows for a distinction between appropriate laws
establishing local government monopolies providing public services
such as waste disposal, and inappropriate laws favoring the self-
interest of in-state private businesses over out-of-state competion.'
The Court concluded that "[c]ompelling reasons justify treating" laws
favoring public facilities "differently from laws favoring particular
private businesses over their competitors., 2  Chief Justice Roberts
maintained "States and municipalities are not private businesses-far
from it. Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the
responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law,
P.O. Box 210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Tel: 513-556-
0094; Fax 513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Kenneth Karst for his
comments. Unfortunately, I received some interesting comments from Brian Galle
criticizing the Davis decision too late in the editing process to incorporate into this article;
hopefully, I can address his arguments in my future work. This Article builds upon my
previous article, Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different From Private Ones?:
Adopting a New Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. Rev.
157, 160-62 (2007). All errors or omissions are my responsibility.
1. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-47 (2007).
2. Id.
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citizens."3  Additionally, the Court emphasized that courts should
apply the DCCD more leniently in the area of waste disposal because
it is a traditional local government function.' In its 2008 decision,
Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, the Court reaffirmed
United Haulers' distinction between laws preferring government
activities serving the public interest and laws favoring local private
firms at the expense of other private firms, but clarified to what
extent it matters whether a government function is traditional or
nontraditional This article argues there are compelling reasons to
treat public entities differently from private entities, but that courts
should be wary of focusing on whether a government function is
traditional or nontraditional.
Even though the Constitution's Commerce Clause only expressly
grants Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce,6 for
more than a century the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to
grant federal courts an implied authority under the DCCD to strike
down state or local laws that discriminate against out-of-state firms or
goods.7 In 1994, the Supreme Court in C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown invalidated under the DCCD a local government "flow
control" ordinance requiring all solid waste in its jurisdiction to be
sent to a single privately-operated transfer station as unconstitutional
per se discrimination against out-of-state businesses seeking to haul
or dispose of that waste The Carbone Court did not address
whether a state or local government could enact a similar flow control
scheme if the government itself owned the waste facility, although
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in that case argued flow control
laws favoring publicly owned facilities are not per se discrimination
and should be subject to a the less rigorous Pike balancing test.9
In 2006, the Second Circuit held public waste monopolies that do
not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state private firms are
not subject to the Carbone decision's per se test, but the Sixth Circuit
3. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
4. Id. at 344.
5. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
6. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 337-40 (2007); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995); Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different
From Private Ones?: Adopting a New Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 60 SMU L. REV. 157, 160-62 (2007).
8. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,386, 394 (1994).
9. Id. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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disagreed 0° Resolving a split in the circuits, the Supreme Court in
United Haulers agreed with the Second Circuit's view that Carbone
addressed only flow control laws discriminating in favor of a
particular private company, and did not control a case involving a
flow control ordinance favoring a public facility that equally
discriminated against all in-state and out-of-state private firms." In
United Haulers, Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion for the Court
concluded the challenged ordinances did not violate the DCCD
because they did not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state
private firms. 2 He emphasized that courts applying the DCCD
should analyze laws favoring public entities differently from those
favoring local private firms because the former often serve important
public interests in the health and welfare of citizens, while the latter
usually simply enrich particular local firms at the expense of their
competitors.'3 Roberts also suggested courts should be especially
deferential if a challenged government monopoly is performing a
traditional local government function.'" The Court concluded the
challenged ordinances conferred important health and environmental
benefits by promoting a broad range of recycling that would be more
costly or impossible to achieve if, in the alternative, the counties had
sought to regulate private firms to achieve the same goals. 5
Additionally, the Court observed it was significant that the extra costs
of the flow control ordinance primarily fell upon the voters and
residents of the counties rather than out-of-state interests.'
6
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justices Stevens and Kennedy. 7 Justice Alito maintained that the
10. Compare United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.
(United Haulers II), 438 F.3d 150, 157-60 (2d Cir. 2006), aff'd, 550 U.S. 330 (2007) with
Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 909-12 (6th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 127 S. Ct. 2294 (mem.) (2007) (vacating judgment and
remanding case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further
consideration in light of United Haulers; Mank, supra note 7, at 158, 184-90 (discussing
split between the Second and Sixth Circuit over whether laws favoring public waste
disposal violate the DCCD).
11. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338-43.
12. Id. at 343.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 344.
15. Id. at 347.
16. Id. at 345.
17. Id. at 356-71 (Alito, J., dissenting). It is worth observing that Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion in Carbone and that Justice Stevens joined the Carbone
majority opinion; these two justices presumably believed that the United Haulers decision
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Court in DCCD cases never treated laws discriminating in favor of
public facilities differently from laws discriminating in favor of private
facilities."8  Furthermore, Justice Alito criticized the majority's
argument that courts should give special deference to public
monopolies performing a "traditional" government function because
the Court's prior cases demonstrated that a distinction between
traditional and nontraditional government functions was unworkable,
since it is too difficult to draw a line between the two.' 9 Additionally,
Alito challenged the view that waste collection is a traditional
government function since most landfills are privately operated, and
questioned whether the counties' monopolistic facilities are
comparable to "traditional" municipal landfills.'
In Davis, Justice Souter's majority opinion clarified to what
extent the Court gives greater deference under the DCCD to
"traditional" government functions. Justice Alito's dissenting opinion
in United Haulers argued the Court's exemption of traditional
government functions from strict scrutiny was unworkable because it
required the Court to make arbitrary distinctions between traditional
and nontraditional functions.2' Additionally, Justice Kennedy's
dissenting opinion in Davis argued the Court used circular reasoning
in exempting local police power regulation from the DCCD.22 In a
footnote in Davis, Justice Souter explained the United Haulers
decision had not meant to "draw fine distinctions among
governmental functions, but to find out whether the preference was
for the benefit of a government fulfilling governmental obligations or
for the benefit of private interests, favored because they were local."23
Justice Souter's footnote clarified that the United Haulers decision's
exemption of traditional government functions from rigorous scrutiny
under the DCCD was based on the fundamental issue of whether the
law appropriately served the public interest or inappropriately
favored private interests, and was not simply based on the history of a
government practice.24
was inconsistent with the Carbone decision. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 384-85 (1994) (listing members of majority opinion).
18. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 360-64.
19. Id. at 368-69.
20. Id. at 369.
21. Id. at 368-69 (Alito, J., dissenting).
22. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
23. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812 n.9.
24. Id.
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This Article argues that Souter's footnote rectifies a potentially
serious problem in the application of the United Haulers decision to
future DCCD cases. Although it was appropriate for the United
Haulers decision to give some weight in its analysis to the fact that
waste disposal is a traditional government function, the Court's
distinction between traditional and nontraditional government
functions was likely to cause problems in future DCCD cases where
the distinction would be more ambiguous or irrelevant, as the Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority decision
demonstrated.25 Because, as Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in
United Haulers correctly pointed out, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between traditional and nontraditional government
activities, courts should follow Justice Souter's explanation in Davis
that the determining factor of whether a law is valid under the DCCD
is whether it appropriately favors the government's provision of
26public services, or inappropriately prefers local private interests.
Thus, courts should focus on whether a challenged local law fulfills a
legitimate public purpose or instead favors local private firms at the
27expense of out-of-state firms.
On the whole, there is a case for treating laws favoring public
facilities differently from those promoting the interests of local
private firms. Chief Justice Roberts in United Haulers demonstrated
that public facilities are more likely to be concerned with protecting
the public health and welfare than typical private facilities, which are
primarily motivated by profits.8 In theory, local governments could
enact regulations attempting to force private firms to match the
environmental record of public facilities, but the United Haulers
decision concluded it is more difficult for local governments to
enforce regulations against private firms than to address public health
and welfare concerns directly through a public facility.29
Furthermore, courts can use the Pike balancing test to prevent state
and local governments from abusing laws favoring public facilities as
a pretext for favoring local interests at the expense of out-of-state
interests.30  In United Haulers, the Court used the Pike test to
determine that local residents bore most of the extra costs associated
25. See infra Part V.C.
26. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812 n.9; see infra Part V.C.
27. See infra Part V.C.
28. See infra Part III.C.3.
29. See infra Part III.C.3.
30. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); infra Part I.C.2.
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with the flow control laws and that the ordinance at issue imposed at
most only incidental burdens on interstate commerce. Together,
United Haulers and Davis appropriately emphasize that the dormant
Commerce Clause's purpose is to prevent local private favoritism, but
not to force governments to turn over public functions to private
markets.32
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I summarizes the
DCCD. Part II discusses the Carbone decision. Part III explores the
Court's United Haulers decision. Part IV examines the Davis
decision. Part V argues it is appropriate to treat laws that prefer
public facilities serving a valid public purpose differently from laws
that discriminate in favor of local private firms.
I. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
A. Justification for the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The Constitution does not mention a dormant Commerce Clause
nor explicitly grant courts the authority to invalidate state or local
laws that interfere with interstate commerce.3 The Commerce Clause
expressly provides that "Congress shall have Power... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. 3 4 Nevertheless, since the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to implicitly authorize
federal courts to invalidate state or local laws which violate the
Clause's "dormant" principle that those laws may not unduly
interfere with interstate commerce, even where Congress has not
adopted a law prohibiting local discrimination.35 The Court has
invoked the DCCD to invalidate local laws serving the goal of
"economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed to
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors."36 Because the DCCD is an implied doctrine justified
31. See infra Part III.C.4.
32. See infra Part V.C.3.
33. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 347-48 (1997).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 279 (1873); Cooley v.
Bd. of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 299, 318 (1852); Mank, supra note 7, at 160-61; Martin H. Redish & Shane V.
Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism,
1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 575-81 (discussing historical development of DCCD).
36. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992); accord West Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 (1994) (stating "the cardinal principle that a State may not
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upon Congress' presumptive intent to forbid economic protectionism
by local governments and states, Congress can override the DCCD if
it enacts clear legislation authorizing local governments to adopt
discriminatory measures,37 although Congress rarely enacts legislation
directly overriding the Court's DCCD decisions.38
There are three primary arguments supporting the DCCD. First,
a structural argument contends local protectionist laws that harm
fellow states are contrary to the Constitution's central goals of
political union and cooperation among states.39  Second, some
decisions and commentators support the DCCD by maintaining the
framers of the Constitution intended the Commerce Clause to
promote free markets by eliminating protectionist trade barriers."0
Other commentators, however, argue the framers did not intend to
create a national free market above all considerations of state
sovereignty." Third, some decisions and commentators argue the
DCCD serves the representative process goal of preventing elected
officials in one jurisdiction from imposing burdens on people in other
jurisdictions who did not elect them. 2
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Mank, supra note 7, at 160-61.
37. Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003) (recognizing congressional
authority to override DCCD); Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1773-75 (2004);
Mank, supra note 7, at 161; but see Norman W. Williams, Why Congress May Not
"Overrule" the Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 158 (2005) (arguing
Congress may not override DCCD because it is constitutional doctrine).
38. Chen, supra note 37, at 1784-87 (observing that Congress "very rarely" overrides
the Court's DCCD decisions).
39. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The history of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence has shown
that even the smallest scale discrimination can interfere with the project of our Federal
Union."); Friedman, supra note 33, at 348-49; Mank, supra note 7, at 161; but see Redish &
Nugent, supra note 35, at 599-601 (criticizing structural argument for DCCD because
Constitution only gives Congress the authority to invalidate state laws promoting
protectionism).
40. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997); C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90, 393 (1994); Friedman, supra note 33, at 354-55; Mank,
supra note 7, at 161.
41. Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce
Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 78-80 (1980); Julian N. Eule,
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-35 (1982); Mank,
supra note 7, at 161, 178.
42. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-68, 767 n.2 (1945) ("The Court has often
recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside
the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints
normally exerted when interests within the state are affected."); Mank, supra note 7, at
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Some critics of the DCCD have argued that the doctrine should
be abolished because it lacks textual support in the Constitution.
Justice Thomas has argued the Court should abolish the DCCD
because the text of the Commerce Clause grants authority to
Congress to regulate commerce, and not the federal courts.43
Similarly, Justice Scalia has criticized the doctrine as "arbitrary,
conclusory, and irreconcilable with the constitutional text."" Unlike
Justice Thomas, however, Justice Scalia has been willing to follow the
Court's DCCD precedent as long as a decision does not expand the
doctrine." Additionally, some critics of the DCCD argue Congress
should not have to enact affirmative legislation to override a doctrine
that has no basis in the text of the Constitution. 6 One scholar,
however, has argued that Congress has implicitly acquiesced to the
DCCD by not enacting legislation to override it, although that
argument fails to address Justices Thomas's and Scalia's textualist
argument that constitutional doctrines must be justified by the text of
the Constitution.
Other critics of the DCCD have argued the doctrine should be
limited because of federalist concerns that an expansive reading of
the doctrine threatens appropriate state and local autonomy. Before
the United Haulers decision, some judges and commentators criticized
the Court for too aggressively applying the DCCD to invalidate local
laws having only a limited effect on interstate commerce but
161, 202-05; Robert R. M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and
the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1250-55 (1997); but see Redish &
Nugent, supra note 35, at 612-17 (criticizing democratic process model as justification for
DCCD because the language of the Constitution does not authorize federal courts to
consider such values nor to invalidate laws using the DCCD).
43. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 349-55 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Redish & Nugent, supra note 35, at 569-619 (arguing DCCD has no constitutional validity
because the text of the Constitution does not authorize the doctrine).
44. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
46. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 615-17 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing theory that Congressional inaction justifies DCCD);
Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 262 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(same); Laura Gabrysch, Casenote, Constitutional Law-Dormant Commerce Clause-Flow
Control Ordinances That Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility Violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 563, 591, 600 (1995).
47. See Chen, supra note 37, at 1764-1800.
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significant local benefits.48 Similarly, state and local officials have
often accused the Court of misusing the DCCD to unduly interfere
with local laws.49 In United Haulers, twenty-six states joined a brief
supporting the flow control laws; not a single state supported the
challengers. °
B. Market Participant or Market Regulator?
The DCCD prohibits state and local governments from using
their coercive regulatory authority to discriminate against out-of-state
firms. 1 If a local government is acting as a market participant rather
than a market regulator, however, its actions are exempt from
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 2 In United Haulers, the flow control laws
were clearly regulatory in nature because the ordinances imposed
coercive penalties on private haulers who failed to comply, including
"permit revocation, fines, and imprisonment. 5 3
C. The Per Se and Pike Tests
When a local government acts as a market regulator, courts
apply two different tests to determine whether a challenged law
violates the DCCD 4  First, if a law facially, purposefully, or
effectively discriminates against interstate commerce, courts apply a
48. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the "expansive view of the Commerce Clause [that] calls into
question a wide variety of state laws that have hitherto been thought permissible");
Lincoln L. Davies, Note, If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental
Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL.
LAW J. 207, 248-52 (1999) (arguing Court's DCCD decisions during 1980s and 1990s
applied doctrine too broadly); Mank, supra note 7, at 162, 164 (same).
49. DOUGLAS T. KENDALL ET AL., REDEFINING FEDERALISM: LISTENING TO THE
STATES IN SHAPING "OUR FEDERALISM," 82, 90 (Douglas T. Kendall ed., Entl. Law Inst.
2004); Mank, supra note 7, at 159, 162.
50. Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007) (No. 05-1345).
51. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994); Mank,
supra note 7, at 162.
52. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,277 (1988); Mank, supra note 7,
at 162.
53. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 1), 261 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd, 550 U.S. 330 (2007); Mank, supra note 7,
at 180, 185.
54. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,624 (1978); Mank, supra note
7, at 162-63; Verchick, supra note 42, at 1249.
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very strict per se test.5 Second, for local laws that may hinder
interstate commerce but are not clearly discriminatory, the Supreme
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. applied a balancing test to
determine whether a law's burdens on interstate commerce are
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."56 The
Court has conceded it is frequently unclear whether a local law with
alleged discriminatory purpose or effect should be analyzed under the
per se or the Pike test even though the choice of the test is often
outcome determinative. 7
1. Per Se Discrimination
The Court applies the per se test to three different types of
discrimination. 8 First, the simplest example of a discriminatory law is
one that facially discriminates by "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."59 For example, the Court has invalidated laws
that impose higher taxes or bans on waste from other jurisdictions.6"
Second, a court will strike down a facially neutral law if a legislature
enacted it to purposely discriminate.6' Third, when a facially neutral
law has obvious discriminatory effects, the Court reviews it under the
per se standard.62
55. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Mank, supra note 7, at 163.
56. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Mank, supra note 7, at
163,165.
57. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 43 (2003); Mank, supra note 7, at 163, 165.
58. Mank, supra note 7, at 163-64; Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State
Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 578-82 (1997); Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a
Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination
Against Interstate Commerce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1063, 1076-84 (2002) ("A statute is per se
invalid if it discriminates against interstate commerce on its face, in its purpose, or in its
effect.").
59. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Mank,
supra note 7, at 163; O'Grady, supra note 58, at 578-81, 582-87.
60. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)
(invalidating differential fees for out-of-state waste); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627
(invalidating waste import ban).
61. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A finding that state
legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of . ..
discriminatory purpose...."); Mank, supra note 7, at 163-64.
62. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275-76, 278-79 (1988)
(invalidating reciprocal tax credit because it "in effect, taxes a product made by [Indiana]
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The Court presumes that all discriminatory local laws are invalid
unless a local government demonstrates a nondiscriminatory
alternative is not available to effectuate an important local purpose
unrelated to economic protectionism.63 In only one case has the
Supreme Court allowed a local government to enforce a
discriminatory law: Maine v. Taylor, in which the Court held the State
of Maine could forbid importation of out-of-state baitfish because the
ban was the only practicable method to avoid the contamination of its
rivers by parasites and alien fish species. '
2. The Pike Balancing Test
The Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. applied a
balancing test to determine whether a law's burdens on interstate
commerce are "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits., 65 A local law is valid under the Pike test "where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental." 66 A court
is much more likely to uphold a local law under the Pike test than
under the per se rule.67
The Pike Court never clearly explained how courts should
balance the benefits and burdens of a challenged law.68 It provided
only this vague explanation:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.69
manufacturers at a rate higher than the same product made by Ohio manufacturers");
Mank, supra note 7, at 164; O'Grady, supra note 58, at 581-82.
63. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90, 390 (1994);
KENDALL, supra note 49, at 81; Mank, supra note 7, at 163.
64. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,148, 151 (1986); Mank, supra note 7, at 163.
65. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Mank, supra note 7, at
163, 165.
66. Id. at 142.
67. Mank, supra note 7, at 163, 165; O'Grady, supra note 58, at 573-75.
68. James D. Fox, Note, State Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 175, 188-90 (2003); Mank,
supra note 7, at 165.
69. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Mank, supra note 7, at 165; Paula C. Murray & David B.
Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America's Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 71, 77 (2003).
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Before the United Haulers decision, the Court failed to further
clarify the Pike test. For example, in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, the Court vaguely explained that "incidental burdens on
interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a State legislates to
safeguard the health and safety of its people."7
II. Carbone
A. Majority Opinion
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Supreme
Court, in a decision written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, interpreted the
DCCD to prohibit any local law that prevents access to local waste
disposal markets, even if the law treats all in-state and out-of-state
firms the same except for a designated private provider.7' The Court
invalidated Clarkstown's ("the Town") flow control ordinance
requiring that all non-recyclable, non-hazardous solid waste
generated within the Town or generated outside the Town and
brought into the Town be processed at a designated privately
operated transfer station as violating the DCCD's per se standard.
The Court rejected the Town's argument that its export restriction
was different from the import or export bans the Court invalidated in
prior cases, because its flow control ordinance treated in-state and
out-of-state waste and waste facilities evenhandedly.73 The Court also
rejected the Town's argument that for this reason the ordinance
should be reviewed under the Pike balancing test, and instead applied
the stricter per se standard.74 The Court's expansive reading of the
DCCD was consistent with a series of cases in the 1980s and 1990s
that applied the per se test broadly and minimized the use of the Pike
test.75
70. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978); Mank, supra note
7, at 165.
71. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386-92, (1994).
72. Id. at 386-92.
73. Id. at 390-92; Joi Elizabeth Peake, South Carolina Loses a Battle in the Hazardous
Waste Wars: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to Invalidate South Carolina's
Hazardous Waste Laws in Environmental Technology v. Sierra Club, 76 N.C. L. REV. 650,
673 n.155 (1998).
74. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390-92.
75. David S. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 47-51 (2007) (arguing
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Clarkstown had good policy reasons for facilitating the creation
of the challenged transfer station. The New York State Department
of Environmental Conservation required Clarkstown to close its
landfill, which had a history of environmental violations, and to build
a new solid waste transfer station on the same site]6 The Town signed
a contract with a local private firm in which the firm agreed to
construct the station and operate it for five years." The Town was
entitled to purchase the facility for one dollar after the private owner
78
enjoyed a five-year monopoly on processing waste. To insure the
financial viability of the transfer station, the Town guaranteed the
operator a minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons per year and
authorized it to charge haulers who deposited waste at the station a
tipping fee of eighty-one dollars per ton, a rate which significantly
exceeded the disposal cost of unsorted solid waste on the private
market.79  To enforce the plan, the Town enacted a flow control
ordinance, Local Law 9, which imposed fines and a maximum of
fifteen days in jail on any hauler who took municipal solid waste
("MSW") from the Town without having it processed at the
designated transfer station.8°
The central issue in the Carbone case was whether the ordinance
was discriminatory because it favored the designated private
contractor, or was non-discriminatory because it treated all other
firms the same, regardless of whether they were in-state or out-of-
state.81 Twenty-three state attorneys general and numerous local
governments filed amicus briefs supporting the Town's position that
Rehnquist Court between 1992 and 2005 expanded use of per se discrimination test and
used Pike test less frequently); Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 217, 221, 242-56 (1995) (arguing Court during 1980s and 1990s used per se test
more frequently); Klein, supra note 57, at 48-52 (finding "that indeed the Court is
expanding its view of discriminatory purpose" in DCCD cases); Mank, supra note 7, at 164
(stating Court expanded the type of cases in which it applied per se test and used Pike test
less frequently); M. A. McCauliff, The Environment Held in Trust for Future Generations
or the Dormant Commerce Clause Held Hostage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40
VILL. L. REV. 645, 658-59 (1995) (same); O'Grady, supra note 58, at 575-76, 582-87
(same).
76. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 386-87.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 395-400 (Appendix containing Town of Clarkstown, Local Law No. 9 of the
year 1990; a local law entitled, "Solid Waste Transportation and Disposal"); id. at 419
(Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 387.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 390-92.
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the ordinance was non-discriminatory.8 2 The Court conceded there is
a distinction between laws favoring all local firms over all out-of-state
competitors and the Clarkstown ordinance, which preferred one firm
over all other local or out-of-state competitors.83 Nevertheless, the
Court determined that "this difference just makes the protectionist
effect of the ordinance more acute" than several local laws it
invalidated in the past that banned all out-of-state competitors but
allowed out-of-state firms to compete if they built facilities within the
local jurisdiction."8 Accordingly, the Court reasoned the law was
invalid under the DCCD even though it discriminated equally against
all other local or out-of-state competitors.85
The Court went beyond its traditional test of whether a local law
discriminated against out-of-state firms compared to in-state firms
and instead interpreted the DCCD as prohibiting all local laws that
interfere with free market access to a local market, unless a
community can demonstrate there is no alternative method of
achieving important health and safety goals." While the ordinance
did not bar the import or export of waste, the Court concluded the
article of commerce at issue "is not so much the solid waste itself, but
rather the service of processing and disposing of it."" The Court
found that the "flow control ordinance drives up the cost for out-of-
state interests to dispose of their solid waste," because the ordinance
required Carbone to send the non-recyclable portion of any out-of-
82. Id. at 384.
83. Id. at 392.
84. Id.; but see Klein, supra note 57, at 51-52 (questioning Carbone's finding that the
ordinance was discriminatory even though it treated in-state and out-of-state competitors
alike); Mank, supra note 7, at 176-78 (arguing Carbone court should not have applied per
se test to ordinance that treated in-state and out-of-state firms the same); Verchick, supra
note 42, at 1274, 1285 (arguing that the Carbone Court should have used similar logic as in
the Court's racial discrimination and Equal Protection Clause cases where the Court asks
whether the municipality intended to discriminate before applying strict scrutiny).
85. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
86. Friedman, supra note 33, at 354-55 ("Undoubtedly Congress could decide in favor
of an entirely free market, but it has not done so, and the Court's limited
antidiscrimination and antiprotectionism decisions do not justify the result in Carbone.");
Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 230-31, 268-70 (comparing Carbone to Lochner in an effort
to promote markets); Mank, supra note 7, at 176-78 ("criticiz[ing] Carbone for going
beyond the prevention of discrimination against out-of-state competitors, a core value of
the DCCD, to a promotion of free-market competition"); McCauliff, supra note 75, at
661-64, 673-85 (criticizing Carbone's market-based discrimination test); O'Grady, supra
note 58, at 604-06 (same); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 139, 149, 153-59 (1994) (same) [hereinafter Supreme Court, 1993 Term].
87. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 391.
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state waste to the transfer station at an additional costY. For waste
originating in the Town, the Court concluded the ordinance harmed
out-of-state interests by "preventing everyone except the favored
local operator from performing the initial processing step. The
ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a local
market., 89 Furthermore, because the Town "hoards solid waste, and
the demand to get rid of it, for the benefit of the preferred processing
facility," the Court determined that "the flow control ordinance at
issue here squelches competition in the waste-processing service
altogether, leaving no room for investment from outside." 9 Thus, the
Court held the ordinance impermissibly discriminated against
interstate commerce in violation of the DCCD by restricting access to
the local waste market even though the ordinance harmed in-state
firms and out-of-state interests equally, except for the designated
private firm.91
Applying the per se test because it concluded the ordinance
impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce, the Court
placed on the Town the burden of "demonstrat[ing], under rigorous
scrutiny, that it had no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest."92 The Court concluded the ordinance was not exempt under
the necessity exception to the per se rule, because the Town had
alternative, nondiscriminatory methods to advance its legitimate
interest in health and safety by enacting "safety regulations" to
"ensure that competitors like Carbone do not underprice the market
by cutting corners on environmental safety."93 The Court considered
the Town's interest in providing sufficient revenue to pay for the cost
of the facility an insufficient reason for the ordinance's discrimination
against out-of-state interests, because "the town may subsidize the
facility through general taxes or municipal bonds." 94
B. Justice O'Connor's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment
In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor
argued the ordinance was non-discriminatory and the Court should
therefore have applied the Pike test rather than the per se test,
88. Id. at 389.
89. Id. at 383.
90. Id. at 392.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 392-93.
94. Id. at 394.
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because "the garbage sorting monopoly [was] achieved at the expense
of all competitors, be they local or nonlocal."95 Disagreeing with the
majority, she contended the discrimination decisions relied upon by
the majority involved significantly different facts in which "the
challenged enactment gave a competitive advantage to local business
as a group vis-a-vis their out-of-state or nonlocal competitors as a
group. In effect, the regulating jurisdiction.., drew a line around
itself and treated those inside the line more favorably than those
outside the line."96  She maintained the ordinance's evenhanded
application was a "significant distinction," because "the existence of
substantial in-state interests harmed by a regulation is 'a powerful
safeguard' against legislative discrimination."'9  Justice O'Connor
persuasively argued the Court should have applied the Pike test to a
local law which did not discriminate on the basis of geographical
location.
Although she found the ordinance non-discriminatory, Justice
O'Connor concluded it was unconstitutional under the Pike test
because its burdens on interstate commerce exceeded its benefits.98
She argued courts in DCCD cases should consider the total impacts a
law would have if other jurisdictions were to adopt similar legislation
and then determined that the potential burdens of the Clarkstown
ordinance on interstate commerce were substantial.' Accordingly,
she argued the Court in the Carbone case should weigh the impact of
similar ordinances in the twenty states that had already adopted
legislation authorizing flow control ordinances and the reasonable
possibility that other states would adopt similar legislation."° Justice
O'Connor maintained courts applying the Pike balancing test should
evaluate whether the local purpose "can be achieved by other means
that would have a less dramatic impact on the flow of goods." 1° She
agreed with the majority opinion that the Town could have used less
discriminatory means to finance the facility "by imposing taxes, by
issuing municipal bonds, or even by lowering its price for processing
to a level competitive with other waste processing facilities. '"1' 2 Justice
95. Id. at 403-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 403.
97. Id. at 404.
98. Id. at 404-05.
99. Id. at 406-07.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 405.
102. Id. at 405-06.
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O'Connor, however, failed to consider that the important
environmental benefits the flow control ordinance provided would
not be as easily achieved by these less discriminatory means and that
the local residents bore most of the costs. 03
C. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion: Public Facilities Are Different
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, argued that laws favoring
public facilities are different from ones preferring local private firms
because the former do not discriminate between in-state and out-of-
state private firms.' The United Haulers decision adopted many of
his arguments, but distinguished Carbone by concluding the majority
in that earlier case concluded that Clarkstown's facility was privately
owned, and not a public facility, as Justice Souter argued in his
Carbone dissent.0 5 Although United Haulers was distinguished from
Carbone on the basis of its facts, United Haulers' acceptance of a
public trash disposal monopoly was philosophically closer to Justice
Souter's dissenting opinion than the Carbone majority.'
Justice Souter asserted the majority wrongly implied that the
DCCD requires local governments to provide access to any local
market, including the local waste disposal market. 7 Instead, he
contended the doctrine simply prohibited local governments from
favoring local private actors at the expense of out-of-state
competitors.' 8 Because the DCCD only prohibits local governments
from preferring local private firms over their out-of-state competitors,
he maintained that the doctrine does not prohibit local governments
from establishing a public monopoly excluding all private firms
located both in-state and out-of-state, especially for services that local
governments have traditionally provided as a public service.Y He
103. See id. at 412, 422-30 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing flow control laws provide
important environmental benefits and impose burdens on local residents); Gabrysch,
supra note 46, at 587-91 (same); Mank, supra note 7, at 167-68, 175-77 (same and arguing
Justice O'Connor failed to appreciate advantages of flow control laws); McCauliff, supra
note 75, at 649 n.ll, 650-51, 653, 656, 673 (arguing flow control laws provide important
environmental benefits); see infra Part II.D.
104. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 339-41 (2007); see infra Part III.C.2.
106. Id. at 342-45; see infra Part II.B.
107. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 416-17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 416-17.
109. Id. at 416-25.
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argued the transfer station in Clarkstown was essentially public in
nature because the Town had the right to purchase the facility for one
dollar after five years, stating, "Clarkstown's transfer station is
essentially a municipal facility.., and soon to revert entirely to
municipal ownership.." He argued the Court should have applied
the Pike test to a quasi-public facility and concluded that the
environmental benefits of the facility out-weighed any incidental
restrictions the ordinance imposed on out-of-state commerce.'
Justice Souter argued the Court should treat laws preferring
public facilities differently from ordinances that discriminate in
preference of local private firms because special protections for
private enterprise are usually based on economic favoritism toward
local interests, but ordinances promoting public facilities are
frequently based on valid public health or welfare concerns."' He
argued that waste collection and disposal is a "municipal function that
tradition as well as state and federal law recognize as the domain of
local government. '" 3 He observed that "[t]hroughout the history of
this country, municipalities have taken responsibility for disposing of
local garbage to prevent noisome smells, obstruction of the streets,
and threats to public health, and today 78 percent of landfills
receiving municipal solid waste are owned by local governments. '
He noted that two 1905 decisions of the Court rejected constitutional
challenges to municipal waste monopolies, although neither case
involved the DCCD.1 Additionally, he commented that in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court "'recognized
that the States occupy a special and specific position in our
constitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under
110. Id. at 419.
111. Id. at 418-30.
112. Id. at 412-14, 420-21, 428-29.
113. Id. at 419.
114. Id. at 419-20 (citing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle D Study: Phase 1 Report, p. 4-7 (Oct. 1986)
(Table 4-2)) (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 419 n.10 (citing Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S.
306 (1905) (upholding against a takings challenge an ordinance requiring that all garbage
in San Francisco be disposed of, for a fee, at facilities belonging to F. E. Sharon); Gardner
v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (upholding against due process challenge an ordinance
requiring that all garbage in Detroit be collected and disposed of by a single city
contractor); Mank, supra note 7, at 186 (discussing Supreme Court's two 1905 garbage
monopoly decisions).
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the Commerce Clause must reflect that position.' ' ' 116 Accordingly,
Justice Souter asserted the Court should apply the more lenient Pike
test in deciding whether laws favoring public facilities violate the
DCCD."7  Because laws preferring public facilities do not
discriminate between local and out-of-state private firms, he
contended that such laws should not be reviewed under the per se
discrimination test."' Many of his arguments for treating public
monopolies differently from private ones were adopted in United
Haulers. 119
Justice Souter agreed with Justice O'Connor that the Court
should apply the Pike balancing test to the Clarkstown ordinance
instead of the per se test applied by the majority.' Disagreeing with
Justice O'Connor, however, Justice Souter argued the Town's
ordinance did not violate the Pike test.'2' He conceded the Town's
transfer station was more expensive than Carbone's private facility,
but he argued that the higher cost of a public facility does not violate
the DCCD because the doctrine prohibits only discrimination against
out-of-state interests, and does not require the least costly method of
service or production."
Implicitly criticizing the majority's free market interpretation of
the DCCD, Justice Souter argued the Commerce Clause does not
endorse the laissez faire assumptions in the Court's long-discredited
1905 decision Lochner v. New York.2 3  He quoted the Court's
decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, which stated the
"dormant Commerce Clause does not 'protec[t] the particular
116. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 421 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)).
117. Id. at 418-24.
118. Id.
119. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-46 (2007); see infra Part III.C.
120. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422-24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 422-23, 430.
122. Id. at 424.
123. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Justice Souter quoted Justice Holmes'
famous observation in his dissenting opinion in Lochner that the Fourteenth Amendment
"'does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics . .. [or] embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism ... or of laissez faire."' Carbone, 511 U.S. at
424-25 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)); Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 230-31, 268-70 (comparing
Carbone to Lochner in an effort to promote markets); Mank, supra note 7, at 177 n.172
(discussing Justice Souter and other commentators who criticized Carbone for adopting a
free market theory of the Commerce Clause analogous to Lochner).
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structure or methods of operation in a[ny] ... market."' 24 He
contended the majority wrongly interpreted the DCCD to require
local governments to open access to all local markets when the "only
right to compete that it protects is the right to compete on terms
independent of one's location.
1 25
Next, Justice Souter claimed the Town's ordinance was
presumptively valid under the DCCD because most of the economic
costs were absorbed by local residents rather than out-of-state
actors. 26 The United Haulers decision incorporated this argument.
127
He argued that the Court in prior cases invalidated a local law only
where the law increased the cost of local goods in out-of-state
markets.' 2  He maintained there was no evidence of any burden on
interstate commerce because the challenger, Carbone, was a local
firm and there was no evidence in the record that an out-of-state
facility desired or was able to process the Town's waste.
121
Furthermore, justice Souter asserted that "[p]rotection of the public
fisc is a legitimate local benefit directly advanced by the ordinance"
because the burdens of the ordinance were borne primarily by local
residents."' Moreover, Justice Souter claimed the Town's ordinance
provided environmental benefits because by "proportioning each
resident's burden to the amount of trash generated, the ordinance has
the added virtue of providing a direct and measurable deterrent to
the generation of unnecessary waste in the first place."'' He
concluded the ordinance was constitutional under the Pike test
because the Town's residents absorbed the higher cost of operating a
public landfill and it imposed only incidental burdens on out-of-state
actors.
132
124. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 425 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 425-28.
127. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-45 (2007); see infra Part III.C.
128. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 425 (Souter, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 427-28.
130. Id. at 429.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 425-30.
[Vol. 37:1
NEW PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
D. Carbone's Flawed and Overly Expansive Approach to the DCCD
The Carbone Court's application of the per se test to a local law
that treated all in-state and out-of-state private firms the same except
for a private contractor who was essentially acting on behalf of the
Town is highly questionable.' Adopting a strict free-market
interpretation of the DCCD, the Court treated any local law denying
private firms access to a market as per se discriminatory.3 There was
no evidence of actual discrimination against, or harm to, out-of-state
firms.135 For instance, there was no evidence in the record that the law
actually increased costs for out-of-state persons.'36 Because there was
no evidence of actual discrimination, the Carbone Court should have
applied the Pike test to the Town's non-discriminatory ordinance.'37
Justice O'Connor persuasively argued the Court should have
applied the Pike test, but her balancing of the benefits and burdens of
the ordinance was flawed. In applying the Pike balancing test, she
underestimated the benefits of flow control laws and overestimated
the costs of such legislation.'38 Her argument that courts should
consider the total economic impact of flow control laws on the
national waste market is reasonable. 39  But she failed to appreciate
the environmental advantages of flow control laws. Public waste
facilities are more likely to pursue environmentally positive practices
such as recycling and waste reduction than private facilities, which
generally focus on profits alone. " Local recycling has significant
benefits because the farther trash is moved, the greater the risk of
spills and contamination.'4' Furthermore, flow control ordinances
employing waste reduction programs such as recycling or incineration
may limit the potential legal liability of municipalities by reducing the
133. Mank, supra note 7, at 176; O'Grady, supra note 58, at 603-04.
134. Mank, supra note 7, at 170, 176-78.
135. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting); O'Grady, supra note 58, at 603--06.
136. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389; Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 245.
137. Mank, supra note 7, at 176-78, 192-93, 199, 205-07.
138. Mank, supra note 7, at 176-77.
139. Carbone, 511 U.S at 406-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
140. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 11), 438 F.3d 150, 162 (2d Cir. 2006); Gabrysch, supra note 46, at 589-90 (arguing
municipal flow control ordinances are more likely to promote sound recycling practices
than private firms); Mank, supra note 7, at 167-68, 170 (same); McCauliff, supra note 75,
at 649 n.11, 650-51, 653, 673 (same).
141. Davies, supra note 48, at 259.
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amount of waste contaminated with hazardous substances.1 42  Since
local residents bear most of the costs of flow control ordinances, there
is little harm to foreign jurisdictions.143 Additionally, flow control
laws can actually benefit other jurisdictions by preventing them from
receiving harmful waste' 4
Justice Souter convincingly argued the Court should treat laws
creating public monopolies serving the public health and welfare
differently from laws favoring local private firms at the expense of
out-of-state private firms by applying the Pike test to the former and
the per se test only to the latter type of discriminatory law.14'5 As is
discussed in Part III, the United Haulers decision agreed with his
reasoning that public monopolies which treat all private firms the
same regardless of their geographical location should be evaluated
under the Pike test rather than the per se test.1 4'6 Applying the Pike
test, Justice Souter showed that the environmental benefits of the
ordinance clearly outweighed any incidental burdens on the interstate
market because most of the costs were borne by local residents.4 7
Similarly, the United Haulers decision found that the challenged flow
control ordinances were valid under the Pike test because they
provided significant environmental benefits and imposed most costs
on local residents, with only incidental burdens on interstate
148
commerce.
142. Flow control laws could reduce a local government's liability for tort suits. United
Haulers 11, 438 F.3d at 162. Municipalities or their inhabitants could also be liable under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA") for waste that is improperly disposed of with hazardous substances. See 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2006) (stating governments and private parties may recover
"response costs" for cleanup from a responsible person); Gabrysch, supra note 46, at 596
n.119 (same); Mank, supra note 7, at 168 (arguing flow control laws can reduce the toxicity
of waste through recycling and incineration); id. at 171 n.115 (arguing flow control laws
can reduce municipal liability for toxic waste); Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramowitz,
Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the Post-Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
361, 367-69 (1995) (same).
143. Carbone, 511 U.S at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. Mank, supra note 7, at 170 n.113 (arguing flow control laws help reduce risks to
other jurisdictions); see also Davies, supra note 48, at 259 (stating that risk of spills and
contamination is greater the longer the distance trash is moved).
145. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 412-29 (Souter, J., dissenting); O'Grady, supra note 58, at
603-06.
146. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-45 (2007); infra Part III.C.4.
147. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 425-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345; infra Part III.C.4.
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III. United Haulers and National Solid Waste Management
Association v. Daviess County, Kentucky
A. United Haulers Association Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority: The Lower Court Decisions
1. District Court Decision
In United Haulers, Oneida and Herkimer counties in New York
State ("the Counties") enacted flow control regulations requiring all
solid wastes and recyclables within the Counties to be delivered to
one of several waste processing facilities owned by the Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority ("the Authority"), a
municipal corporation.149 The Authority charged a per-ton "tipping"
fee for waste substantially higher than the fees charged on the open
market in New York State."5  The plaintiffs, United Haulers
Association, Inc., a New York waste company, and several other New
York waste firms, filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York arguing the ordinances violated the
DCCD."'
In 2000, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. 2 The district court concluded the Counties' flow
control ordinances were similar to the law struck down by the
Carbone Court, and constituted per se discrimination in favor of one
preferred waste processor."' The district court rejected the
defendants' argument that their actions were not discriminatory
because they were public facilities and enjoined enforcement of the
flow control ordinances.
2. The Second Circuit: United Haulers I
Reversing the district court's decision, the Second Circuit in 2001
held the district court wrongly applied the per se test to the
ordinances because they did not favor local business interests and
149. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 11), 438 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2006).
150. Id. at 154.
151. Id. at 153.
152. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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therefore are not discriminatory.155 The Second Circuit concluded
that "the district court erred in its Commerce Clause analysis by
failing to recognize the distinction between private and public
ownership of the favored facility" and that "in doing so, the district
court also effectively foreclosed the Counties' ability to show that
they had no reasonable alternatives to implementing flow control
laws" under the Pike balancing test.'56 The Second Circuit remanded
the case for discovery so that the district court judge could garner the
additional facts needed to apply the Pike test.157
The Second Circuit distinguished the Carbone decision as being
concerned with prohibiting local governments from favoring in-state
private businesses, and as not addressing laws requiring that all waste
be handled by local public facilities.5 8 The plaintiffs argued the
Carbone decision did not distinguish between private and public
facilities, but the Second Circuit determined that "the Carbone
majority referenced the private character of the favored facility
several times."'' 9 Although it acknowledged the Carbone majority
opinion never explicitly adopted the public-private distinction and
that "its language can fairly be described as elusive on that point," the
Second Circuit interpreted the Carbone decision as implicitly treating
public facilities differently from private ones. The Second Circuit
argued the Carbone "Justices were divided over the fact of whether
the preferred facility was public or private, rather than on the import
of that distinction."'' The court interpreted Carbone as a case in
which a local government discriminated in favor of a private operator
over out-of-state businesses. 62  Conversely, the Second Circuit
determined that Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion and Justice
Souter's dissenting opinion in Carbone viewed the station as a public
facility. 63 Additionally, the Second Circuit interpreted several prior
Supreme Court decisions as having "evidence[d] the same intent to
155. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 1), 261 F.3d 245, 263 (2d Cir. 2001).
156. Id. at 256 n.3, 257.
157. Id. at 256-57, 264.
158. Id. at 258-59.
159. Id. at 258-60.
160. Id. at 259-60.
161. Id. at 259.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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prevent state or local governments from preferring in-state business
or investment at the expense of out-of-state businesses."
1
'
6
Rebuffing the plaintiffs' contention that the DCCD proscribed
local governments from "hoarding" local resources, including the
waste processing market, the Second Circuit concluded the Clause
only barred local laws authorizing local private businesses to hoard
resources, stating "that a local law discriminates against interstate
commerce when it hoards local resources in a manner that favors
local business, industry or investment over out-of-state
competition."' ' The United Haulers I court quoted a portion of the
Carbone decision's discussion of the hoarding issue in which the
Supreme Court appeared to be concerned with hoarding by local
private businesses: "Put another way, the offending local laws hoard a
local resource-be it meat, shrimp,.., milk [or garbage]-for the
benefit of local businesses that treat it. '' 166  The Second Circuit's
argument that the Supreme Court's decisions were only concerned
with local private businesses "hoarding" natural resources, including
waste and waste processing services, but unconcerned with whether a
local government hoarded those same resources is problematic
because "hoarding" would appear to harm interstate commerce
whether the hoarder was a private or public entity. 1 7 Additionally,
the United Haulers I court made a more convincing distinction
between public and private facilities when it asserted that laws
preferring public facilities were less likely to be protectionist, as well
as "less likely to give rise to retaliation and jealousy from neighboring
states" than laws favoring private facilities."" The Second Circuit also
made a strong argument that the challenged ordinances did not
violate the DCCD because their main economic burden was borne by
local residents rather than out-of-state firms or people.69
Because "a flow control ordinance governing the processing of
waste is not discriminatory under the Commerce Clause unless it
favors local private business interests over out-of-state interests," the
Second Circuit held that "flow control regulations like the Oneida-
Herkimer ordinances, which negatively impact all private businesses
alike, regardless of whether in-state or out-of-state, in favor of a
164. Id. at 260-61.
165. Id. at 261.
166. Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392) (emphasis added by Second Circuit).
167. Mank, supra note 7, at 184.
168. United Haulers 1, 261 F.3d at 261.
169. Id. at 261-62.
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publicly owned facility, are not discriminatory under the dormant
Commerce Clause."17  The Second Circuit held the district court
erred in applying the per se standard and remanded the case for a
decision as to whether the requirement imposed an "undue burden"
on interstate commerce under the Pike test."' The court of appeals
held the district court must consider a facility's public ownership
when applying the Pike test.'
In an opinion concurring in the result and with the majority
opinion, Judge Calabresi stated, "[wiaste disposal is both typically
and traditionally a local government function. With respect to such
functions, the opinion's analysis of the significance of public
ownership under Carbone seems to me quite right. Whether the same
analysis would apply to activities that are not traditionally
governmental is not before us."'73 The Supreme Court subsequently
adopted much of the public-private distinction analysis in United
Haulers I and agreed with Judge Calabresi that waste disposal is a
traditional government function.74
3. The 2006 Second Circuit Decision: United Haulers II
In 2005, in an unreported decision, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, upholding the flow
control regulations under the Pike test, because "'the challenged laws
do not treat similarly situated in-state and out-of-state business
interests differently,"' and therefore the ordinances "do not impose
any cognizable burden on interstate commerce. 17 5 In their appellate
briefs, the challengers conceded that "the ordinances afford equal
treatment to all commercial entities without regard to their location,"
but argued the, district court erred in applying the Pike test by not
evaluating whether the ordinances burdened interstate commerce by
"prevent[ing] goods and services from flowing across internal political
boundaries.', 7 6  In 2006, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
170. Id. at 263.
171. Id. at 263-64.
172. Id. at 264.
173. Id. (Calabresi, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
174. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-45 (2007).
175. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers II), 438 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting unreported district court decision).
176. Id. at 155-56.
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court's decision that the Counties' flow control ordinances were valid
under the Pike test.77
Applying its "different burden" interpretation of the Pike test,
the Second Circuit determined that the counties' ordinances did not
treat in-state private firms differently from out-of-state firms. 178 The
Second Circuit rejected the challengers' argument that the ordinances
violated the Pike test because the Circuit has understood the Pike
balancing test to place a burden on the challenger to prove that a
challenged local law "'imposes a burden on interstate commerce that
is qualitatively or quantitatively different from that imposed on
intrastate commerce.' ' 179 Anticipating that the Second Circuit would
reject their challenge to the ordinances under the "different burden"
standard, the challengers asserted that the Second Circuit's different
burden interpretation of the Pike test was flawed and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's approach to the test because the Circuit in
its United Haulers I decision did not consider the issue of a public
monopoly that hoarded resources within one state.' 8° Responding to
the challengers' criticism of how the United Haulers I decision and the
subsequent district court decision applied the different burden test,
the Second Circuit in United Haulers II acknowledged that the issue
of possible hoarding by local public monopolies should be examined
by courts under the Pike test.'81 By contrast, the earlier United
Haulers I decision, in which two of the three judges on the panel were
different from the later decision, seemed unwilling to acknowledge
that hoarding by a public entity could ever be a problem under the
DCCD. 82 While it was more willing to consider the hoarding issue
than the United Haulers I decision, the United Haulers H court
concluded that any possible hoarding of resources by the counties had
177. Id. at 153.
178. Id. at 156-57.
179. Id. (quoting Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2001));
accord Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Pine Belt Reg'I Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 389
F.3d 491, 500-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying Pike test to require challenger to demonstrate
local law imposes different burden on interstate commerce than intrastate commerce); but
see U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus, 205 F.3d 1063, 1067-72 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying
Pike test to invalidate a city law that imposed restrictions only on in-state competition).
180. United Haulers H, 438 F.3d 150 at 159-60 (2d Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 160-62.
182. See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 1), 261 F.3d 245, 261 (2d Cir. 2001). Only Judge Calabresi sat in both United
Haulers decisions. In United Haulers 11, Judges Katzman and Wesley sat instead of Judges
Meskill and Leval. Mank, supra note 7, at 185 n.235.
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no significant burden under the Pike test because any burden
imposed by the ordinances "is blunted considerably by the absence of
any suggestion that these ordinances have any practical effect other
than to raise the costs of performing waste collection services within
the Counties, and thus the prices paid by local consumers of those
services." '183 The Second Circuit concluded the burden on interstate
commerce as measured by the Pike test was low, because the burdens
of the ordinances fall mostly on local residents rather than out-of-
state interests.'18
The Second Circuit also concluded the burden imposed by the
flow control ordinances on the movement of waste to other states was
acceptable under the DCCD"' The Second Circuit conceded that
"the interstate market for waste disposal services would suffer if
numerous jurisdictions were to impose restrictions like these on
private entities that engage in trash collection."'86 Nevertheless, the
United Haulers H court concluded that this burden was acceptable
under the DCCD because the Supreme Court since at least 1905 had
"allowed municipalities to exercise the greater power of taking
exclusive control of all locally generated solid waste from the moment
that it is placed on the curb.', 87  The United Haulers II court
determined that any burden from the Counties' ordinances on
commerce was permissible under the DCCD because Supreme Court
and Second Circuit precedent authorized local governments to
establish waste monopolies.'8'
The United Haulers II decision understood the DCCD as having
two main goals. First, the DCCD has the goal of "safeguard[ing] the
ability of commercial goods to cross state lines primarily as a means
to protect the right of businesses to compete on an equal footing
wherever they choose to operate."'89 Second, the DCCD allows
"states and municipalities to exercise their police powers without
undue interference from the laws of neighboring jurisdictions."'90 The
Second Circuit determined, "where neither of these underlying
183. United Haulers 11, 438 F.3d 150 at 160.
184. Id. at 160-62.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 161.
187. Id. (citing Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) and Cal. Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905)).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,539 (1949)).
190. Id. (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989)).
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purposes is implicated by a particular legislative enactment, the
burden imposed on interstate commerce must be regarded as
insubstantial. "191
The Second Circuit concluded the ordinances provided several
local benefits that were significantly greater than the "slight" burden
imposed by the ordinance.' Although financial advantages are not
sufficient to vindicate a local law that discriminates against interstate
commerce, the court determined that courts may weigh the financial
benefits of non-discriminatory flow control ordinances."3 The United
Haulers II court also concluded the ordinances provided significant
environmental protection benefits. 194 The court determined that "the
flow control measures substantially facilitate the Counties' goal of
establishing a comprehensive waste management system that
encourages waste volume reduction, recycling, and reuse and ensures
the proper disposal of hazardous wastes, thereby reducing the
Counties' exposure to costly environmental tort suits."' 95 Although it
agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the counties could use
alternative methods to insure the Authority's financial health, the
Second Circuit found that only the flow control ordinances "could
address [the Counties'] liability concerns or encourage recycling
across the wide range of waste products accepted by the Authority's
recycling program.', 9 6 The United Haulers II court determined that
under the Pike test "the local benefits of the flow control measures
substantially outweigh whatever modest differential burden they may
place on interstate commerce."' 9 The court concluded, "[b]ecause the
Pike test places the onus on the plaintiffs to show that this burden is
clearly excessive in relation to these benefits, we easily find that the
Counties' flow control ordinances do not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause, and therefore do not decide whether the
ordinances burden interstate commerce at all."'99  As is discussed
below, Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion subsequently adopted
most of the analysis in United Haulers I.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 161-62.
194. Id. at 162.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 162-63.
197. Id. at 163.
198. Id.
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B. National Solid Waste Management Association v. Daviess County,
Kentucky
In National Solid Waste Management Association v. Daviess
County, Kentucky, the Sixth Circuit expressly disagreed with the
public-private ownership distinction in United Haulers I and adopted
reasoning clearly contrary to the subsequent United Haulers H
decision, which was decided twenty-three days after Daviess
County.'99 Daviess County in Kentucky enacted a flow control
ordinance creating a county waste monopoly for all MSW collection
services similar to the ordinances at issue in United Haulers.20" A
private trade association representing several waste collection,
transportation, and disposal firms in the county filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
arguing the ordinance violated the DCCD by prohibiting firms from
exporting waste to out-of-state sites, including sites owned by some of
its members. °'  In 2004, the district court issued a declaratory
judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutional and a permanent
injunction barring the defendant from enforcing the ordinance 2"O
Affirming the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit
determined the ordinance facially discriminated against out-of-state
interests by prohibiting the plaintiff's members from using other in-
state and out-of-state facilities. °3 While it agreed with the County's
argument that the ordinance did not treat out-of-state waste
collectors differently from in-state collectors, the court concluded the
ordinance "discriminates against out-of-state waste disposal
facilities. '" 204 The court thus determined the ordinance violated the
DCCD by prohibiting out-of-state firms from offering waste disposal
services even though it imposed the same restriction on in-state
businesses."
199. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Daviess County, 434 F.3d 898, 909-12 (6th Cir.
2006), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 550 U.S. 931 (2007) (vacating judgment and
remanding case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further
consideration in light of United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007)).
200. Id. at 900-01.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 900.
203. Id. at 905.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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Expressly rejecting United Haulers I's distinction between laws
favoring public monopolies as opposed to laws favoring local private
firms, the Sixth Circuit "respectfully disagree[d] with the Second
Circuit on the proposition that Carbone lends support for the public-
private distinction drawn by that court."2°6 The Sixth Circuit asserted
the Carbone Court invalidated the Clarkstown ordinance because it
"'deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a local market"' and that
the Supreme Court did not make a distinction based on whether a
flow control law established a private or public waste monopoly. °m
The Sixth Circuit contended that the Carbone court's emphasis "was
on the economic harm to out-of-state actors and the local market"
arising from the ordinance "'bar[ring] the import of the processing
service."' 2 8 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit determined that "the crux of
the inquiry is whether the local ordinance burdens interstate
commerce, not whether the local entity benefited by the ordinance is
publicly owned."2°  The Sixth Circuit asserted the "free access"
purpose of the DCCD mandated that courts examine a challenged
local law's effects on out-of-state markets instead of whether the law
benefits a local private or public firm.1
The United Haulers decisions and the Daviess County decision
essentially revisited the philosophical arguments in the Carbone
majority opinion and Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in that case.
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Daviess County was more closely
aligned with the underlying "market access" reasoning in Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Carbone."' By contrast, the Second
Circuit's United Haulers I decision limited Carbone to its facts
involving a privately operated facility."2 The Second Circuit's public-
private distinction was closer to the reasoning in Justice Souter's
206. Id. at 910. The Sixth Circuit stated that its rules of precedent precluded it from
adopting the Second Circuit's approach because prior Sixth Circuit precedents found
"dormant Commerce Clause violations in cases where the facility was publicly owned."
Id.
207. Id. at 910-11 (quoting C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994)) (emphasis supplied by Sixth Circuit).
208. Id. at 911 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 910-11.
211. Mank, supra note 7, at 176-78, 190.
212. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers 1), 261 F.3d 245, 258-60 (2d Cir. 2001); Mank, supra note 7, at 180-81.
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dissenting opinion in Carbone. As a result of the split between the
Second and Sixth Circuits, the Supreme Court finally addressed the
issue of whether it should apply a different DCCD standard for public
monopolies established by local laws rather than the strict per se
approach it had used for private monopolies in Carbone.
C. The Supreme Court Adopts the Public-Private Distinction in United
Haulers
In light of the Second and Sixth Circuit's diametrically opposite
conclusions about whether flow control laws favoring public facilities
violate the DCCD, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits. In his majority decision in
United Haulers, Chief Justice Roberts essentially adopted the Second
Circuit's approach of treating flow control laws favoring public
facilities as fundamentally different from those preferring private
facilities.214 He began his opinion by characterizing the Carbone
decision as invalidating "a flow control ordinance that forced haulers
to deliver waste to a particular private processing facility., 215  He
stated the "only salient difference" between the Carbone decision and
the United Haulers case before the Court "is that the laws at issue
here require haulers to bring waste to facilities owned and operated
by a state-created public benefit corporation. 21 6  The majority
concluded that "this difference [between private and public facilities
is] constitutionally significant., 217 Because "[d]isposing of trash has
been a traditional government activity for years," the Court
determined that "laws that favor the government in such areas-but
treat every private business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly
the same-do not discriminate against interstate commerce for
purposes of the Commerce Clause.""2 8  Applying the Pike test, a
plurality of the Court then concluded the benefits of the challenged
ordinances outweighed any incidental burdens they may have on
interstate commerce.t 9
213. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 7, at
173-78, 190-91.
214. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 341-47 (2007).
215. Id. at 334, 341.
216. Id. at 334.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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1. Flow Control Laws Serve an Important Public Purpose in Addressing
a Waste Crisis
The Court emphasized that the challenged flow control
ordinances served an important public purpose in addressing serious
environmental problems with the disposal of waste in those
Counties."' The Court observed that "[t]raditionally, each city, town,
or village within the Counties has been responsible for disposing of its
own waste. Many had relied on local landfills, some in a more
environmentally responsible fashion than others." By the 1980s, "the
Counties confronted what they could credibly call a solid waste
'crisis"' as "[m]any local landfills were operating without permits and
in violation of state regulations."22' Because of these violations, state
and federal environmental officials ordered the closure and
environmental remediation of sixteen landfills at a cost of tens of
millions of dollars to the public.2 One federal cleanup action against
a landfill in the area led the defendants in that case to name more
than 600 local businesses and several municipalities and school
districts as third-party defendants.22 Furthermore, the Court argued
that private waste disposal companies in the two counties caused
serious problems that contributed to the waste crisis in the area. The
Court stated, "The Counties had an uneasy relationship with local
waste management companies, enduring price fixing, pervasive
overcharging, and the influence of organized crime. 22 4 Chief Justice
Roberts observed that, "[d]ramatic price hikes [by private waste
companies] were not uncommon: In 1986, for example, a county
contractor doubled its waste disposal rate on six weeks' notice.,
225
To address these serious waste problems, New York State
created the Authority at the two Counties' request.226  While the
Authority charged higher fees than private firms, the Court observed
that "the fees enabled the Authority to provide recycling of 33 kinds
of materials, as well as composting, household hazardous waste
disposal, and a number of other services., 227 To insure the financial
stability of the Authority, the counties enacted flow control
220. Id. at 334-35.
221. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 4).
222. Id. at 335.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 336.
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legislation requiring private waste collectors to deliver all solid waste
within the county to Authority facilities.2 8 The ordinances authorized
the Counties to impose penalties for noncompliance against firms that
failed to deliver their waste to the county facilities, including the
revocation of the firm's waste-hauling permit, fines, and
imprisonment."
2. Carbone Treated the Clarkstown Facility as Privately Owned.
The Court concluded Carbone treated the Clarkstown facility as
privately owned and that the Carbone majority had not reached the
issue of whether to treat public facilities differently.3° Chief Justice
Roberts observed that Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Carbone
characterized the Clarkstown transfer station as a public facility that
should be treated differently under the DCCD from laws favoring
private facilities, but that the Carbone "majority did not comment on
the dissent's public-private distinction., 231' He noted that "[t]he
parties in this case draw opposite inferences from the majority's
silence., 23 2  Chief Justice Roberts interpreted Carbone as being
concerned with discrimination in favor of local private businesses at
the expense of out-of-state competitors. He noted that Carbone
treated Clarkstown's flow control ordinance as "'just one more
instance of local processing requirements that we long have held
invalid."'233 He observed that Carbone "then cited six local processing
cases, every one of which involved discrimination in favor of private
enterprise., 234 He then quoted the Carbone decision's description of
the six processing cases as involving "'offending local laws [that]
hoard a local resource-be it meat, shrimp, or milk-for the benefit
of local businesses that treat it." '25 Chief Justice Roberts concluded
that "[i]f the [Carbone] Court were extending this line of local
processing cases to cover discrimination in favor of local government,
one would expect it to have said so.
' 36
228. Id.
229. Id. at 337.
230. Id. at 340.
231. Id. at 339.
232. Id.
233. Ld. at 340 (quoting C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386,391 (1994).
234. Id. (citation omitted).
235. Id. at 341 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).
236. Id. (citation omitted).
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Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts maintained other aspects of
the Carbone Court's reasoning strongly implied that it was not
addressing the issue of public facilities. He observed the "Carbone
majority stated that 'the only conceivable distinction' between the
laws in the local processing cases and Clarkstown's flow control
ordinance was that Clarkstown's ordinance favored a single local
business, rather than a group of them." '237 He reasoned that "[i]f the
Court thought Clarkstown's processing facility was public, that
additional distinction was not merely 'conceivable'-it was conceived,
and discussed at length, by three Justices in dissent.""23 He concluded,
"Carbone cannot be regarded as having decided the public-private
question.
'
,131
3. Flow Control Laws Benefiting Public Facilities are Different from
Laws Favoring Private Facilities.
Having concluded that Carbone did not address public facilities,
the Court in United Haulers held flow control laws that "benefit a
clearly public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the
same," as in this case, "do not discriminate against interstate
commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause."24 The
Court concluded "[c]ompelling reasons justify treating" laws
preferring public facilities "differently from laws favoring particular
private businesses over their competitors."24' In General Motors
Corp. v. Tracy, the Court stated that "[c]onceptually, of course, any
notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar
entities. '' 12  Chief Justice Roberts relied on that principle in
maintaining that "[s]tates and municipalities are not private
businesses-far from it. Unlike private enterprise, government is
vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens. 24 1 "Given these differences," the United
Haulers Court reasoned, "it does not make sense to regard laws
favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with
equal skepticism." The Court observed its local processing cases
showed that "rigorous scrutiny is appropriate" for laws preferring in-
237. Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).
238. Id.
239. Id. (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 342.
241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997)).
243. Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)).
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state business over out-of-state competition "because the law is often
the product of 'simple economic protectionism.' 2" Conversely, the
Court concluded that "[1]aws favoring local government... may be
directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to
protectionism., 245 In United Haulers, the Court found the challenged
flow control ordinances fulfilled "legitimate goals unrelated to
protectionism" by "enabl[ing] the Counties to pursue particular
policies with respect to the handling and treatment of waste
generated in the Counties, while allocating the costs of those policies
on citizens and businesses according to the volume of waste they
generate.
246
The Court reasoned the "contrary approach of treating public
and private entities the same under the dormant Commerce Clause
would lead to unprecedented and unbounded interference by the
courts with state and local government. 2 47 Chief Justice Roberts did
not specifically identify who was asserting this contrary approach, but
his criticism was likely directed at Justice Alito's dissenting opinion.
The majority opinion warned that the "dormant Commerce Clause is
not a roving license for federal courts to decide what activities are
appropriate for state and local government to undertake, and what
activities must be the province of private market competition.,
248
Addressing the facts in the case, the United Haulers Court observed
that "the citizens of Oneida and Herkimer Counties have chosen the
government to provide waste management services, with a limited
role for the private sector in arranging for transport of waste from the
curb to the public facilities. 2 49 Based on a limited role for the DCCD
in regulating states and local governments, the Court declared that
"[i]t is not the office of the Commerce Clause to control the decision
of the voters on whether government or the private sector should
provide waste management services.""25 Quoting its decision in Maine
v. Taylor, the Court observed, "'The Commerce Clause significantly
limits the ability of States and localities to regulate or otherwise
burden the flow of interstate commerce, but it does not elevate free
244. Id. at 343 (quoting Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 344.
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trade above all other values.' 251 The United Haulers Court's view on
this point is contrary to the underlying free access to markets
reasoning in Carbone.252
Additionally, the Court asserted that courts should be more
deferential in applying the DCCD to traditional local government
functions, stating, "[w]e should be particularly hesitant to interfere
with the Counties' efforts under the guise of the Commerce Clause
because '[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local
government function."'253  Chief Justice Roberts also observed that
Congress had given local governments a central role in waste
management by "making clear that 'collection and disposal of solid
wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional,
and local agencies.' 254 Furthermore, the Court noted that New York
law authorized local governments to impose regulation or public
monopolies in the area of waste management."' The Court
concluded, "[w]e may or may not agree with [New York's] approach,
but nothing in the Commerce Clause vests the responsibility for that
policy judgment with the Federal Judiciary. 25 6
As its final reason for why the ordinances were non-
discriminatory, the Court reasoned that "it bears mentioning that the
most palpable harm imposed by the ordinances-more expensive
trash removal-is likely to fall upon the very people who voted for
the laws., 257  The Court observed that "[o]ur dormant Commerce
Clause cases often find discrimination when a State shifts the costs of
regulation to other States, because when 'the burden of state
regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be
alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally
exerted when interests within the state are affected.' 25 8 The majority
was alluding to the controversial political process theory for the
DCCD, which asserts the doctrine is designed to prevent local
251. Id. (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,151 (1986)).
252. See infra Part V.A.
253. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 344 (quoting United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United Haulers 1), 261 F.3d 245, 264 (2d Cir. 2001)
(Calabresi, J., concurring)).
254. Id. (quoting Res. Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4)
(1984)).
255. Id. (quoting N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law Ann. § 2049-tt(3) (1995)).
256. Id. at 344-45.
257. Id. at 345.
258. Id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-768 n.2
(1945)).
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governments from imposing burdens on non-citizens who cannot rely
on the political process to oppose protectionist measures. 9  By
contrast, in this case, the Court pointed out that "the citizens and
businesses of the Counties bear the costs of the ordinances. There is
no reason to step in and hand local businesses a victory they could not
obtain through the political process." 260
The Court also argued in-state private interests would usually
prevent states and local governments from abusing government
monopolies, and that it would intervene if a government monopoly
interfered too much with interstate commerce. In a footnote, the
Court responded to a question raised at the oral argument about
whether local governments could require "citizens to purchase their
burgers only from the state-owned producer. '261 The Court curtly
responded, "[w]e doubt it. '262  The majority opinion referred to
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., in which the Court
previously observed, "[t]he existence of major in-state interests
adversely affected by [a law] is a powerful safeguard against
legislative abuse., 263 The implication of this quotation is the political
process rationale that it is very unlikely a "hamburger" law could be
passed in any state given the likelihood so many restaurants and
grocers would oppose such legislation. The Court also suggested
courts might be able to strike down a law regulating an area that is
not a traditional local government function, and thus unlike waste
disposal. The Court stated, "[r]ecognizing that local government may
facilitate a customary and traditional government function such as
waste disposal, without running afoul of the Commerce Clause, is
hardly a prescription for state control of the economy."' 64 Finally, the
Court observed that Congress retained express authority under the
Commerce Clause to invalidate a state monopoly.
2 65
259. See supra Part I.A.
260. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345.
261. Id. at 345 n.7 (citing transcript of oral argument and amicus brief of the State of
New York).
262. Id.
263. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17
(1981)).
264. Id. at 345-46 n.7.
265. ld. at 346 n.7.
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4. A Plurality Applies the Pike Test and Concludes the Flow Control
Laws' Benefits Outweigh Any Incidental Burdens on Interstate
Commerce.
A plurality of the Court consisting of Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer applied the Pike test and
concluded the benefits of the Counties' flow control laws outweighed
266any incidental burdens they might have on interstate commerce.
Justice Scalia refused to join this portion of the Court's opinion,
believing the Pike test to be unconstitutional, as he understands the
Commerce Clause to authorize only Congress to weigh the
comparative policy benefits and burdens of local legislation.267
However, the plurality applied the Pike test, which allows local
governments to impose nondiscriminatory burdens on interstate
commerce "'unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'
268
The plurality observed that the lower courts could find no clear
evidence of the ordinances burdening interstate commerce. Chief
Justice Roberts stated, "[a]fter years of discovery, both the Magistrate
Judge and the District Court could not detect any disparate impact on
out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses. 2 69 He acknowledged,
"[t]he Second Circuit alluded to, but did not endorse, a 'rather
abstract harm' that may exist because 'the Counties' flow control
ordinances have removed the waste generated in Oneida and
Herkimer Counties from the national marketplace for waste
processing services."'27  Avoiding the issue of any abstract or
incidental harms that may result from the ordinances, the plurality
concluded, "[w]e find it unnecessary to decide whether the ordinances
impose any incidental burden on interstate commerce because any
arguable burden does not exceed the public benefits of the
ordinances."27'
The plurality determined the ordinances produced many health
and environmental benefits in addition to their usefulness in insuring
266. Id. at 334, 347 (plurality opinion).
267. Id. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
268. Id. at 346 (plurality opinion) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970)).
269. Id.
270. Id. (quoting United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.
(United Haulers II), 438 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2006).
271. Id.
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the financial stability of the Authority. The plurality found that the
ordinances "increase recycling in at least two ways, conferring
significant health and environmental benefits upon the citizens of the
Counties., 273 First, the ordinances "create enhanced incentives for
recycling and proper disposal of other kinds of waste. Solid waste
disposal is expensive in Oneida-Herkimer, but the Counties accept
recyclables and many forms of hazardous waste for free, effectively
encouraging their citizens to sort their own trash.""27  Second, the
ordinance's mandate that all waste in the counties go to Authority
facilities "markedly increased [the Counties'] ability to enforce
recycling laws. If the haulers could take waste to any disposal site,
achieving an equal level of enforcement would be much more costly,
if not impossible. '2 75  The plurality determined that "[f]or these
reasons, any arguable burden the ordinances impose on interstate
commerce does not exceed their public benefits."2 6
5. A Contrary Decision Would Pose the Danger of Judicial
Overreaching and a New Lochner Era
In the conclusion of its opinion, the plurality addressed the
broader philosophical reasons for holding the ordinances
constitutional by strongly implying that a contrary decision could only
be based on judicial overreaching. 77 The plurality observed that the
"Counties' ordinances are exercises of the police power in an effort to
address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern of local
government. '  The plurality summarized the challengers'
arguments:
The haulers nevertheless ask us to hold that laws favoring
public entities while treating all private businesses the same are
subject to an almost per se rule of invalidity, because of asserted
discrimination. In the alternative, they maintain that the
Counties' laws cannot survive the more germissive Pike test,
because of asserted burdens on commerce.
272. Id. at 346-47.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 347.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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The plurality asserted the "common thread to these arguments ... are
invitations to rigorously scrutinize economic legislation passed under
the auspices of the police power." Citing the Court's discredited
opinion in Lochner v. New York, the plurality observed that "[tihere
was a time when this Court presumed to make such binding
judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting the Due Process
Clause."28° The plurality concluded, "[w]e should not seek to reclaim
that ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant
Commerce Clause.""' In arguing a broad application of the DCCD
was akin to the Lochner decision's inappropriate interference with
the police power of states and local governments, the plurality
adopted an approach very similar to Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion in Carbone.2"
D. The Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia joined the portions of the Court's opinion that
concluded the ordinances do not discriminate and therefore are not
subject to the per se discrimination test.283 He did not join the
plurality opinion applying the Pike test because he believes that the
test is unconstitutional, as the text of the Commerce Clause
authorizes only Congress to balance "various values."2'8 He stated he
wrote a separate opinion to reaffirm his view that the DCCD is "an
unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its existing
domain."
2 85
Justice Scalia explained he has been willing to follow the Court's
DCCD precedent "in two situations: '(1) against a state law that
facially discriminates against interstate commerce, and (2) against a
state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law previously held
280. Id. (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
281. Id.
282. See C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 425 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); supra Part III.B-C.
283. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
284. Id. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am unable to join Part II-D of the
principal opinion, in which the plurality performs so-called 'Pike balancing.' Generally
speaking, the balancing of various values is left to Congress-which is precisely what the
Commerce Clause (the real Commerce Clause) envisions.").
285. Id. at 348 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 (1997) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
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unconstitutional by the Court.' ' 2 6 He concluded the challenged flow
control law did not fall into either category of DCCD precedent
because it "benefits a public entity performing a traditional local-
government function and treats all private entities precisely the same
way., 287 He observed, "'[d]isparate treatment constitutes discrimina-
tion only if the objects of the disparate treatment are, for the relevant
purposes, similarly situated. ' ' 2m He asserted, "[n]one of this Court's
cases concludes that public entities and private entities are similarly
situated for Commerce Clause purposes."'2 9 He refused to broaden
the DCCD to regulate public entities because such an approach
would "'intrude on a regulatory sphere traditionally occupied by...
the States.
'
'
21
2. Justice Thomas, Concurring in the Judgment: Abolish the DCCD
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas
argued the Court should abolish the DCCD.291 Unlike Justice Scalia
who is willing to follow but not expand the Court's DCCD precedent,
Justice Thomas would overrule all of the Court's DCCD cases,
including Carbone.292 He stated, "[a]lthough I joined C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Clarkstown, I no longer believe it was correctly decided.,
29
Because the text of the Constitution's Commerce Clause explicitly
confers authority on only Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
Justice Thomas believes it is unconstitutional for the Court to assert
an implied dormant authority to strike down allegedly discriminatory
local laws.294 Although he concurred in the judgment because he
believes the Court lacks authority to invalidate local ordinances like
those at issue in United Haulers, Justice Thomas found the majority's
greater trust of public monopolies than private monopolies an
unconvincing distinction.295 He also argued the majority's attempt to
286. Id. (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
601 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Tracy, 519 U.S. at 313 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
291. See id. at 349-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 349-55.
293. Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
294. Id. at 349-55.
295. Id.
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narrow the DCCD was bound to fail and that only abolition of the
doctrine would end the danger it posed of judicial overreaching.296
E. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion because he believed that
"the provisions challenged in this case are essentially identical to the
ordinance invalidated in Carbone."29 Justice Alito argued that "[t]he
public-private distinction drawn by the Court is both illusory and
without precedent.""29  Justice Stevens, who was a member of the
Carbone majority, and Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Carbone
majority opinion, joined the dissenting opinion.299
1. The Carbone Transfer Station Was Essentially a Public Facility
Justice Alito rejected the majority's view that flow control laws
favoring public-owned facilities are fundamentally different from the
private monopoly invalidated in Carbone.3°° First, he observed the
facility at issue in Carbone was only nominally owned by a private
contractor, but was essentially public in nature because the private
contractor agreed to sell the transfer station to Clarkstown after five
years for one dollar.3 'O He noted the Carbone Court stated that
"'[t]he town would finance its new facility with the income generated
by the tipping fees."'302 Accordingly, Justice Alito concluded the
Clarkstown facility and the Counties' facilities were essentially the
same except for their nominal ownership.3 3
While Chief Justice Robert's majority opinion interpreted the
Carbone majority as implicitly treating the Clarkstown facility as a
private facility," Justice Alito strongly disagreed and argued the
Carbone court treated it as effectively a public facility.0 He observed
the Carbone majority did not dispute Justice Souter's characterization
of the facility as "'essentially a municipal facility.' 306 Additionally,
296. Id. at 353-55.
297. Id. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 358.
299. Id. at 356.
300. Id. at 357-58.
301. Id. at 358.
302. Id. (quoting C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 387 (1994)).
303. Id. at 358-59.
304. Id. at 340 (majority opinion).
305. Id. at 359-60 (Alito, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 359 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 419 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
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Justice Alito pointed out that the Clarkstown ordinance, which the
Carbone majority included in its entirety as an appendix to the
Court's opinion, repeatedly characterized the transfer station as "'the
Town of Clarkstown solid waste facility."'307  Furthermore, he
observed Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion failed to admit the
parties in Carbone openly conceded in their briefs that the station was
municipal in nature.3"
2. When Analyzing Discrimination Under the DCCD, Courts Should
Treat Public Facilities the Same As Private Facilities
Justice Alito further argued the Court's DCCD precedent had
never applied a more deferential standard to local laws that
discriminated in favor of publicly owned facilities.3" He argued that
the Court had misconstrued the Court's DCCD precedent by
misinterpreting the term "local businesses" in Carbone to mean only
private firms."' Justice Alito argued that Carbone's reference to
"businesses" prohibited local laws that discriminated in favor of
either private or public monopolies."' For example, he contended
laws creating state-owned liquor monopolies, which many States
operated today, would be considered discriminatory under the
DCCD, but for the fact that that the Twenty-First Amendment
creates a special constitutional exception for such monopolies."2
Justice Alito argued the Court had allowed deferential treatment for
discriminatory local laws favoring a publicly owned facility only
where the state was acting as a market participant.3"3 He maintained
the market participant exception was inapplicable because the
Counties were using their regulatory authority to exclude competitors
of the Authority's facilities." He criticized the Court's "suggest[ion],
contrary to its prior holdings, that States can discriminate in favor of
307. Id. (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 396, 398, 399).
308. Id. at 359-60 (citing briefs for petitioner and respondent in Carbone, 511 U.S. 383
(1994)).
309. Id. at 360.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 360-62.
312. Id. at 361-62 (citing Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (explaining that
the Twenty-First Amendment makes it possible for States to "assume direct control of
liquor distribution through state-run outlets")).
313. ld. at 362.
314. Id. at 362-63.
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in-state interests while acting both as a market participant and as a
market regulator. '
Justice Alito rejected "the Court's assumption that
discrimination in favor of an in-state facility owned by the
government is likely to serve 'legitimate goals unrelated to
protectionism.""'3 6  He argued legislation preferring local public
facilities would "inur[e] to the benefit of local residents who are
employed at the facility, local businesses that supply the facility with
goods and services, and local workers employed by such
businesses."3 '7  He observed that "[e]xperience in other countries,
where state ownership is more common than it is in this country,
teaches that governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned
businesses (by shielding them from international competition)
precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive economic
benefits from those businesses, including their employees." '318
Accordingly, he concluded that "[s]uch discrimination amounts to
economic protectionism in any realistic sense of the term."3 9 Justice
Alito accused the Court of "send[ing] a bold and enticing message to
local governments throughout the United States: Protectionist
legislation is now permissible, so long as the enacting government
excludes all private-sector participants from the affected local
market.'320
Even if the majority was correct that public monopolies in some
cases advanced the public health and safety, Justice Alito maintained
these monopolies were still unconstitutional under the DCCD.321
Although an in-state private monopoly for all the livestock grown in a
state might be easier for a state to monitor, he argued such a
legislative monopoly "would almost certainly" violate the DCCD
even if it advanced the public health.22  He contended public
monopolies were more discriminatory in some ways than private
monopolies because public monopolies typically benefitted only local
residents, but private firms were often owned by out-of-state
315. Id. at 363.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 364.
321. See id. at 365-66.
322. Id. at 365 (citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627).
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31investors. 23 Accordingly, he rejected the Court's adoption of a moredeferential DCCD test for publically owned enterprises. 4
3. The Majority Failed to Consider the Ordinances' Discriminatory
Means and the Possibility of Nondiscriminatory Alternatives
Justice Alito criticized the Court for only examining the
challenged ordinances' goals while ignoring their discriminatory
means.15 He observed the Court's precedent placed the burden on a
local government to justify a discriminatory law by demonstrating
both that the law served a legitimate purpose and that the purpose
could not be served as well by other nondiscriminatory means.326 He
argued discriminatory legislation serving legitimate goals is valid
under the DCCD only if those goals cannot "adequately be achieved
through nondiscriminatory means. 327 Justice Alito contended the
flow control laws at issue in United Haulers could achieve their goals
through alternative nondiscriminatory means and therefore were
unconstitutional under the DCCD. He argued that the case was no
different from Carbone decision where the Court invalidated the
Clarkstown ordinance because the Town could have used alternative
nondiscriminatory methods such as health regulations or subsidies to
achieve the same goals.3 8
4. The Majority's Traditional Government Function Analysis Is
Unworkable and Waste Processing Is Not a Traditional Local
Government Function
Justice Alito rejected the majority's conclusion that courts should
defer to laws preferring municipal landfills because waste disposal is a
traditional local government function.3 29 First, he argued the Court
had twice3. experimented with giving extra deference to "traditional"
local government functions "only to abandon them later as
323. Id. at 127.
324. Id. at 365-66.
325. Id. at 366.
326. Id. (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).
327. Id. (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)).
328. Id. at 368.
329. Id.
330. Id. (citing Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (addressing intergovernmental tax immunity)).
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analytically unsound.""33 First, in its 1905 decision South Carolina v.
United States, the Court held states were exempt from federal
taxation only for the "ordinary" and "strictly governmental"
instrumentalities of state governments and not for proprietary
instrumentalities "used by the State in the carrying on of an ordinary
private business. 332 In its 1936 decision United States v. California,
the Court interpreted South Carolina's tax exemption to exclude
"activities in which the states have traditionally engaged." '333 In its
1946 decision New York v. United States, however, the Court
unanimously overruled South Carolina and held the distinction
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was
"untenable" and must be abandoned, which effectively overruled
California's tax exemption for traditional government activities.3
Second, in its 1976 decision National League of Cities v. Usery, the
Court held the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to
enforce the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") against the States "in areas of traditional
governmental functions." '335 In 1985, however, the Court in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, overruled the National
League of Cities decision because "[a]lthough National League of
Cities supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental
functions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional'
function is to be distinguished from a 'nontraditional' one. Since
then, federal and state courts have struggled with the task.,
336
"Thus," Justice Alito concluded, "to the extent today's holding rests
on a distinction between 'traditional' governmental functions and
their nontraditional counterparts, it cannot be reconciled with prior
precedent."337
331. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-547
(1985) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); New York v.
United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (overruling South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437 (1905)).
332. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 451, 461 (1905).
333. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
334. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.,
joined by Rutledge, J.); id. at 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and
Burton, JJ.); id. at 590-96 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
335. Nat'l League of Cites v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
336. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530, 538-57 (1985).
337. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 369 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Additionally, while he acknowledged that many American
municipalities have long histories of managing local waste, Justice
Alito disagreed with the majority's assertion that waste disposal is a
traditional government function because the private sector manages
most of the country's solid waste 3 8 Furthermore, he argued that "a
'traditional' municipal landfill is for present purposes entirely
different from a monopolistic landfill supported by the kind of
discriminatory legislation at issue in this case and in Carbone. While
the former may be rooted in history and tradition, the latter has been
deemed unconstitutional until today. 3 39  Accordingly, he asserted
that "[i]t is therefore far from clear that the laws at issue here can
fairly be described as serving a function 'typically and traditionally'
performed by local governments.
3 40
Justice Alito's assertion that the Counties' landfills were
different from traditional municipal landfills is at least partially true
because, as is discussed in the majority opinion, the Counties' landfills
were improved and enlarged in response to a waste crisis that
developed during the 1980s.341 During that decade, there was national
concern about a shortage of landfill space, as the amount of
household MSW grew dramatically compared with much smaller
amounts in 1960.342 Additionally, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"),343 as amended by the Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"), 344 tightened
environmental requirements and placed greater responsibility on
state and local governments to develop plans to safely dispose of
MSW.3 45 As a result, the Counties developed extensive and expensive
338. Id.
339. Id. at 369-70.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 334-35 (majority opinion).
342. Klein, supra note 57, at 8-9 (2003); Mank, supra note 7, at 166.
343. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006).
344. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
345. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (giving states and local governments the primary role in
managing nonhazardous waste); see id. § 6901(b)(2), (8) (encouraging state and local
waste plans); see id. § 6941 (providing planning objectives for solid waste management); id.
§ 6942 (identifying guidelines for state planning); id. §§ 6943, 6947 (listing criteria for
approval of state plans); id. § 6946 (stating procedure for development and
implementation of state plans); H.R. REP. No. 1491-94(I), at 40 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6278 (urging cooperation between federal and state governments in
developing solid waste plans); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978
(Oct. 9, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 256 (1993)) (detailing guidelines for solid waste
planning); Mank, supra note 7, at 166-68.
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recycling programs to reduce the amount of solid waste.46  Thus,
Justice Alito had a point in arguing the Counties' landfills were not
traditional landfills,' 7 but the majority opinion advanced a strong
policy argument that a public monopoly landfill was necessary to
address new waste and environmental issues. 348
5. Even Laws that Treat In-State and Out-of-State Business the Same
Violate the DCCD
Justice Alito disagreed with "the Court's suggestion that the
flow-control laws do not discriminate against interstate commerce
because they 'treat in-state private business interests exactly the same
as out-of-state ones. ' ' '39 He argued this distinction was irrelevant
because "the critical issue is whether the challenged legislation
discriminates against interstate commerce. If it does, then regardless
of whether those harmed by it reside entirely outside the State in
question, the law is subject to strict scrutiny.""35 He contended the
Court for many years invalidated laws burdening interstate commerce
even if they applied equally to in-state residents. In a footnote, he
observed Carbone struck down a law favoring a single, local business
at the expense of both in-state and out-of-state competitors. 352  He
commented that "[i]t is therefore strange for the Court to attach any
significance to the fact that the flow-control laws at issue here apply
to in-state and out-of-state competitors alike." '353 Because a law
preferring a public facility is no different than a law favoring a single
private facility, he reasoned that "[i]t therefore makes no difference
that the flow-control laws at issue here apply to in-state and out-of-
state businesses alike." '354  He concluded that "[t]he dormant
Commerce Clause has long been understood to prohibit the kind of
discriminatory legislation upheld by the Court in this case" and
therefore he would have reversed the Second Circuit's decision.355
346. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 335-346.
347. Id. at 369 (Alito, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 334-35, 346-47 (majority opinion).
349. Id. at 370 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 345 (majority opinion)).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 370 n.4.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 370.
355. Id. at 371.
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IV. Davis: Reaffirming the Public-Private Distinction with
Some Refinements
In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, the Court held
the DCCD did not prohibit Kentucky from exempting interest on
bonds issued by the State or its political subdivisions from state
income taxes, while taxing interest income on bonds issued by other
States and their subdivisions.56 The decision relied upon United
Haulers' principle that government functions are subject to a more
liberal analysis under the DCCD.357 Additionally, the Davis Court
emphasized that exempting state bonds from taxation was a
traditional government function deserving of deference from the
Court, much as the United Haulers decision made a similar deference
argument as to waste disposal.358 Yet in a footnote, Justice Souter's
majority opinion clarified that the United Haulers decision's
exemption of traditional government functions from rigorous scrutiny
under the DCCD was based on the fundamental issue of whether the
law appropriately served the public interest or inappropriately
favored private interests, and was not simply based on the history of a
government practice. 9
356. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810-11, 1819 (2008). On the
other hand, for well reasoned arguments that the Supreme Court in Davis should hold that
discriminatory state taxation of municipal bonds violates the DCCD see Brian D. Galle &
Ethan Yale, Can Discriminatory State Taxation of Municipal Bonds Be Justified?, Tax
Notes, October 8, 2007, pp.153-59; Brian D. Galle & Ethan Yale, Muni Bonds and the
Commerce Clause After United Haulers, Tax Notes, June 11, 2007, p. 1037-46.
357. Id. at 1809-11.
358. Id. at 1810-11, 1819.
359. Justice Souter stated in footnote nine:
Justice Kennedy's dissent (hereinafter dissent) says this is just circular
rationalization, that the United Haulers acceptance of governmental preference
in support of public health, safety, and welfare is the equivalent of justifying the
law as an exercise of the "police power" and thus an exercise in "tautology,"
since almost any state law could be so justified .... But this misunderstands
what we said in United Haulers. The point of asking whether the challenged
governmental preference operated to support a traditional public function was
not to draw fine distinctions among governmental functions, but to find out
whether the preference was for the benefit of a government fulfilling
governmental obligations or for the benefit of private interests, favored because
they were local. Under United Haulers, governmental public preference is
constitutionally different from commercial private preference, and we make the
governmental responsibility enquiry to identify the beneficiary as one or the
other .... Because this is the distinction at which the enquiry about traditional
governmental activity is aimed, it entails neither tautology nor the hopeless effort
to pick and choose among legitimate governmental activity that led to Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ....
Id. at 1810 n.9.
A. Souter's Majority Opinion
The Davis decision maintained that "[i]t follows a fortiori from
United Haulers that Kentucky must prevail because "a government
function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct
from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors."3' ° The
Davis Court observed that United Haulers' exemption of traditional
government functions from rigorous DCCD scrutiny "applies with
even greater force to laws favoring a State's municipal bonds, given
that the issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a
quintessentially public function, with the venerable history we have
already sketched. 3 6' As in United Haulers, the Davis decision
determined that Kentucky could favor its own bonds and those of its
political subdivisions because a public entity financing public projects
is not substantially similar to other bond issuers in the state.3 62
Furthermore, Kentucky treated in-state and out-of-state private
bonds the same and thus did not discriminate in an inappropriate
manner. 363 The Court concluded that United Haulers required it to
uphold the Kentucky tax exemption because it "favors a traditional
government function without any differential treatment favoring local
entities over substantially similar out-of-state interests. '3"
Unlike United Haulers, however, the Davis Court held that a
state's tax scheme is not susceptible to the Pike balancing test.3 65 The
Court concluded that "the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited
to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for
the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case. 3 66 The
Court reasoned that it lacked the institutional competence to
determine the economic impact of eliminating the tax exemption, and
therefore that it could not balance the costs and benefits of the
exemption."' The Court observed that Congress is better
institutionally able to gather data and weigh the risks of eliminating
the exemption, although it was entirely at Congress' discretion
360. Id. at 1810.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1811.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1818-19.
366. Id. at 1817.
367. Id. at 1817-19.
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whether it would choose to use its affirmative authority over
interstate commerce to regulate such benefits.36
B. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion in Davis, Justice Kennedy, who was
joined by Justice Alito, echoed the Carbone decision by arguing the
Framers of the Constitution intended the Commerce Clause to
establish a national free market "unobstructed by state and local
barriers. '3 69  He contended, "[t]he object of creating free trade
throughout a single nation, without protectionist state laws, was a
dominant theme of the convention at Philadelphia and during the
ratification debates that followed.""37 He argued the challenged state
tax exemption of Kentucky bonds was inconsistent with the
Commerce Clause's free market rationale. 7 As discussed in Part
V.C, he also criticized both the majority decision and the United
Haulers decision for applying a more lenient DCCD test for
traditional public functions.7  He argued, however, that the
majority's opinion was inconsistent with United Haulers because that
decision emphasized the flow control laws treated in-state and out-of-
state private businesses the same, but the Kentucky law taxed out-of-
state bonds at a higher rate.373 He maintained the Court's precedent
prohibited states from imposing a discriminatory tax such as
Kentucky's exemption of state bonds from taxation and, therefore,
that the exemption was unconstitutional under the DCCD 74
V. The Public-Private Distinction Is Justified, but the
Traditional-Nontraditional Distinction Is Problematic
While Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion sought to
emphasize that the Court's approach was consistent with DCCD
precedent, the United Haulers decision rejected Carbone's free
market access principle. The United Haulers decision's public-private
distinction is justified because there is a significant difference
between appropriate laws that prefer public entities in order to
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 1823.
371. Id. at 1823-24.
372. Id. at 1824-25; see infra Part V.C.
373. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
374. Id. at 1825-29.
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promote the public welfare, and laws favoring the self-interest of local
private businesses. Justice Souter's Davis decision corrected a
potential flaw in the United Haulers approach by shifting the focus
from whether a local government is performing a "traditional"
government function to whether the law advances the public interest
or impermissibly discriminates in favor of a local private business.
A. The United Haulers Decision Properly Rejected Carbone's Free
Market Access Principle
Although it factually distinguished Carbone as a DCCD case
invalidating a local law favoring a private firm, the United Haulers
decision's acceptance of local government monopolies was
philosophically at odds with the Carbone decision's free market
access principle. The Carbone Court emphasized the DCCD protects
free markets and invalidates any local law that "deprives out-of-state
businesses of access to a local market" even if there is no evidence of
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state firms.375 The United
Haulers decision appropriately rejected Carbone's excessively pro-
free market interpretation of the DCCD. The Carbone decision's
free access to markets interpretation of the DCCD is inconsistent
with the Constitution's federalist principles.376 The authors of the
Constitution did not intend the Commerce Clause to prohibit all non-
discriminatory state laws which incidentally interfere with free
markets.377  Although the founders sought to avoid blatantly
protectionist laws, as one scholar asserts, "[t]here was no intent,
375. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389 (1994);
Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 269-70 (arguing that the Carbone decision emphasized free
market access as essence of DCCD rather than traditional non-discrimination principle);
Mank, supra note 7, at 176-78.
376. Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path":
A Theory of the Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1489-90
(1995) ("Our theory of federalism suggests that the Court should not fetishize the free
national market and should approach the cases with a more lenient eye toward state and
local police and developmental policies."); Mank, supra note 7, at 178; see generally U.S.
CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
377. Anson & Schenkkan, supra note 41, at 78-80; Eule, supra note 41, at 429-35;
Mank, supra note 7, at 178; Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1179 (1986);
Verchick, supra note 42, at 1281-83.
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however, to inject a philosophy of laissez-faire into the constitutional
fabric."37
The Carbone decision's "free access" to local markets theory is
inconsistent with a proper understanding of the Commerce Clause
and the DCCD. As the Harvard Law Review observed, "[i]n striking
down the flow control law, the [Carbone] Court mistook the
Commerce Clause's prohibition against discrimination by a state
within an open market for a requirement that states maintain open
markets."37 9  The one case Carbone cited as support for the free
market access principle, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., is a
famous case involving Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerce under the Commerce Clause, and did not involve the
DCCD.3  Congress in many circumstances may have the authority to
mandate free local markets, but the Court does not.38'
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Carbone and a number of
commentators have criticized Carbone's theory of "access to a local
market" because it appeared to require local governments to open
their services to private contractors and ignored a long history of local
government monopolies in the United States.382 Read broadly, the
Carbone decision's reasoning suggested that any state or local
monopoly, including traditional or core local activities such as
operating prisons or providing law enforcement, is potentially
unconstitutional under the DCCD.383 Justice Souter in Carbone and
some commentators have thus compared Carbone to the Court's
378. Eule, supra note 41, at 435.
379. Supreme Court, 1993 Term, supra note 86, at 153.
380. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 389 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 31 (1937)); Friedman, supra note 33, at 354-55 (discussing Jones).
381. Friedman, supra note 33, at 354-55 ("Undoubtedly Congress could decide in favor
of an entirely free market, but it has not done so, and the Court's limited
antidiscrimination and antiprotectionism decisions do not justify the result in Carbone.").
382. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 410-30 (Souter, J., dissenting); Bednar & Eskridge, supra
note 376, at 1489-90 ("Our theory of federalism suggests that the Court should not
fetishize the free national market and should approach the cases with a more lenient eye
toward state and local police and developmental policies."); Friedman, supra note 33, at
354-55; Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 230-31, 268-70 (comparing Carbone to Lochner in
an effort to promote markets); Mank, supra note 7, at 177-78 ("criticiz[ing] Carbone for
going beyond the prevention of discrimination against out-of-state competitors, a core
value of the DCCD, to a promotion of free-market competition"); McCauliff, supra note
75, at 661-64, 673-85 (criticizing Carbone's market-based discrimination test); Supreme
Court, 1993 Term, supra note 86, at 149, 153-59 (same).
383. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 424-25 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 7, at 178.
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discredited 1905 decision Lochner v. New York.384  Lochner
invalidated a state maximum working hours law because the Court
interpreted the Due Process Clause to implicitly require a free-
market in which employers and employees had the right to make
contracts without government regulation.385 Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion in United Haulers echoed Justice Souter's comparison of
Carbone to Lochner.386 Citing Lochner, Chief Justice Roberts, for a
plurality of the Court, argued that "[t]here was a time when this
Court presumed to make such binding judgments for society, under
the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause." '387 He concluded,
"[w]e should not seek to reclaim that ground for judicial supremacy
under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause." 388 The United
Haulers decision's "judicial modesty" approach was especially
appropriate because Congress in the RCRA encouraged local
governments to take a leading role in addressing waste issues.389
B. A Valid Distinction Exists Between Public Monopolies and Laws
Favoring Local Private Businesses
The United Haulers Court argued that state and local
governments are far different from private businesses because the
former are concerned with the health and welfare of their citizens,
while the latter are concerned with profits.3" To justify its sharp
distinction between appropriate local laws preferring public facilities
from inappropriate laws favoring local private firms, the United
Haulers decision relied on General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, which
reasoned, "[c]onceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination
384. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 424-25 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905); Heinzerling, supra note 75, at 230-31, 268-70 (comparing Carbone to
Lochner in an effort to promote markets); Mank, supra note 7, at 178 (same); McCauliff,
supra note 75, at 661-64, 673-85 (criticizing Carbone's market-based discrimination test);
Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1191, 1230-37 (1998) (arguing Supreme Court's DCCD cases are similar to
free market approach in Lochner).
385. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 58-64 (1905).
386. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (citing Lochner).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Kenneth L. Karst, From Carbone to United Haulers: The Advocates' Tales, 2007
Sup. CT. REV. 237, 266-67 (2007) (arguing United Haulers decision adopted position of
judicial modesty in part because Congress had encouraged local governments to manage
waste).
390. Id.
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assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities."'3 91 As is
discussed below, the Tracy Court treated public utilities as distinct
from private marketers. In doing so, the Tracy decision
foreshadowed the public-private distinction in United Haulers.
In Tracy, the Court held that Ohio's differential treatment of
public utilities and independent marketers regarding the taxing of
natural gas sales did not violate the DCCD.392 Under Ohio law, sales
of natural gas by state-regulated local public utilities, which are
known as Local Distribution Companies ("LDCs"), were exempt
from the state's general sales and use taxes, which applied to sales of
natural gas by other in-state and out-of-state sellers.393 General
Motors Corporation ("GMC"), which bought its natural gas from
excluded independent, out-of-state marketers, argued Ohio's tax
scheme favored in-state utility companies and, therefore, that Ohio
discriminated against out-of-state commerce.' Although the tax
scheme did not expressly differentiate between in-state and out-of-
state firms, GMC argued the scheme was discriminatory in violation
of the DCCD because "by granting the tax exemption solely to
LDC's, which are in fact all located in Ohio, the State has 'favor[ed]
some in-state commerce while disfavoring all out-of-state
commerce."'
395
The Tracy Court found that state and local franchised utilities
sold a heavily regulated "bundled" gas product to residential
consumers, thereby guaranteeing price stability and that the gas
supply would not be terminated during cold winters to indigent
consumers who could not afford to pay.396  Conversely, many
commercial firms like GMC bought unbundled gas from independent
marketers who priced gas according to the fluctuations in the free
market. 97  The Court determined that LDCs and independent
marketers served different markets, as "natural gas marketers did not
serve the Ohio LDCs' core market of small, captive users, typified by
391. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 342 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 298 (1997)).
392. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).
393. Id. at 281-86.
394. Id. at 284-89; Day, supra note 75, at 32; Sara Sachse, Comment, United We Stand-But
for How Long? Justice Scalia and New Developments of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 43 St.
Louis U. L.J. 695, 708 (1999).
395. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 288 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 33).
396. Id. at 288-98, 301-02.
397. Id.
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residential consumers who want and need the bundled product."'398
The Court explained, "[t]hese are buyers who live on sufficiently tight
budgets to make the stability of rate important, and who cannot
readily bear the risk of losing a fuel supply in harsh natural or
economic weather.,
399
The Tracy decision relied on health and public welfare
arguments for treating state-regulated public utilities differently
under the DCCD from private marketers. The Court stated, "[t]he
continuing importance of the States' interest in protecting the captive
market from the effects of competition for the largest consumers is
underscored by the common sense of our traditional recognition of
the need to accommodate state health and safety regulation in
applying dormant Commerce Clause principles. '' 0°  The Tracy
decision's willingness to interpret the DCCD in light of legitimate
health and safety goals is similar to the United Haulers decision's use
of health and safety factors in differentiating public waste facilities
from private waste disposers."' The Tracy Court opined:
We have consistently recognized the legitimate state pursuit of
such interests as compatible with the Commerce Clause, which
was "'never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all
subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens,
though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of
the country."'... Just so may health and safety considerations
be weighed in the process of deciding the threshold question
whether the conditions entailing application of the dormant
Commerce Clause are present.4
In a footnote, the Court qualified its statement that it would
consider the health and safety benefits of challenged state laws in
applying the DCCD by observing that "if a State discriminates against
out-of-state interests by drawing geographical distinctions between
entities that are otherwise similarly situated, such facial
discrimination will be subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny even
398. Id. at 301.
399. Id. at 301-02.
400. Id. at 306.
401. See supra Part III.C.4.
402. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 306-07 (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362
U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960)).
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if it is directed toward a legitimate health and safety goal. 4 0'3 Thus,
the Tracy decision declared that courts will give significant deference
to state or local laws establishing a public monopoly for the public
health or welfare as long as a challenged law does not discriminate
between similarly situated entities such as local and out-of-state
private firms on a geographic basis. Because the Counties' flow
control ordinances did not discriminate between local and out-of-
state private firms, the United Haulers decision appropriately relied
upon Tracy as precedent to support its public-private distinction.
The United Haulers decision presented strong arguments for
treating public waste facilities as functionally different from private
facilities. The United Haulers Court demonstrated that public waste
facilities provided different services or functions than private facilities
through promoting a broad range of recycling, composting and
household hazardous waste disposal services that would be more
costly or impossible to achieve if, in the alternative, the Counties
sought to regulate private firms to achieve the same goals.4°  Public
waste facilities are different because they incorporate health and
environmental goals, such as broad recycling mandates, which are
different from the profit-making goals of private waste firms.45 Thus,
United Haulers was able to demonstrate that public waste facilities
served different functions in the waste market than private firms, and
therefore they were not similarly situated. The Tracy Court made a
similar distinction between Ohio public utilities advancing the public
interest by providing resident customers a fixed price, guaranteeing
service during winter months, and regulating profits, and independent
marketers providing free market natural gas to the noncaptive
market."°
C. Justice Souter's Davis Opinion Explains the Traditional-
Nontraditional Distinction
Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in United Haulers
emphasized that it was inappropriate for the Court to invalidate local
control of waste disposal operations because waste disposal was a
403. Id. at 307 n.15 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-28 (1978);
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353-54 (1951)).
404. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 346 (1994).
405. Id.; Mank, supra note 7, at 166-68; McCauliff, supra note 75, at 656.
406. See Tracy, 519 U.S. at 298-310.
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traditional government function.4 7 Although he made a strong
argument that waste disposal is a traditional government function
that should pass muster under the DCCD, Roberts' use of a
traditional-nontraditional distinction was likely to cause problems for
the Court in future cases where it may not be so obvious whether a
function is traditional or nontraditional. Justice Alito's dissenting
opinion, on the other hand, made a persuasive argument that the
Court failed in the past to develop a workable test for what
constitutes "traditional" state or local government functions.4 °8
In National League of Cities, the Court held Congress could not
use the Commerce Clause to regulate the employment conditions of
state or local employees performing integral operations in traditional
government functions.4 °9 It did not provide a precise definition of
what constitutes a traditional government function, but offered the
following nonexclusive list of examples: "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation.,
41 0
The "sanitation" example was likely intended to include waste
disposal and would thus support Chief Justice Roberts' view that the
waste disposal services in United Haulers were a traditional
government function.411
The Garcia court, however, overruled National League of Cities
because it concluded that the traditional versus nontraditional
distinction was unworkable, as the functions of states have evolved
over time.4 12  For example, the Garcia Court pointed out that
education had once been a private function, but then became a public
one: "The most obvious defect of a historical approach to state
immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes in
the historical functions of States, changes that have resulted in a
number of once-private functions like education being assumed by
the States and their subdivisions."4 " The Garcia Court also observed
the National League of Cities decision had treated public parks as a
traditional government function serving the purpose of public
407. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334, 343-47.
408. Id. at 1810-11 (Alito, J., dissenting).
409. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Auth.. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
410. Id. at 851.
411. See supra Part III.C.3.
412. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1985).
413. Id. at 543-44.
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recreation.414 Garcia demonstrated the National League of Cities
decision misunderstood the history of public parks by quoting an 1893
Court decision which explained that city commons originally were
provided not for recreation, but for grazing domestic animals 'in
common,' and that "[in] the memory of men now living, a proposition
to take private property [by eminent domain] for a public park...
would have been regarded as a novel exercise of legislative power. ''4'1
Because state government functions have continually evolved over
time, the Garcia Court reasoned there was no principled standard for
how ancient or how long-standing a practice must be in order to be
considered traditional. 46 The Court observed, "[r]eliance on history
as an organizing principle results in line-drawing of the most arbitrary
sort; the genesis of state governmental functions stretches over a
historical continuum from before the Revolution to the present, and
courts would have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a
pattern of state involvement had to be for federal regulatory
authority to be defeated. 41 7  The Garcia decision provided a
convincing rationale for why a traditional versus nontraditional test is
unworkable for classifying government functions.
In his dissenting opinion in Davis, Justice Kennedy criticized the
majority's, as well as the United Haulers decision's, use of the
"traditional government function" category to relax scrutiny under
the DCCD.418 He observed, "[t]he Court defends the Kentucky law
by explaining that it serves a traditional government function and
concerns the 'cardinal civic responsibilities' of protecting health,
safety, and welfare., 419  He rejected the majority's approach by
arguing that "[t]his is but a reformulation of the phrase 'police
power,' long abandoned as a mere tautology." 420 Justice Kennedy
explained, "[a] law may contravene a provision of the Constitution
even if enacted for a beneficial purpose., 42' He argued that even a
414. Id. at 544 n.9.
415. Id. (quoting Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 297 (1893)).
416. Id. at 544.
417. Id.
418. Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1824 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
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law serving a valid public purpose is subject to the Commerce
Clause's discrimination analysis.422
In a footnote in Davis, Justice Souter explained Roberts'
traditional-nontraditional distinction and offered a better approach.
In response to Justice Kennedy's criticism, Justice Souter asserted he
had misunderstood the United Haulers' decision because "[tihe point
of asking whether the challenged governmental preference operated
to support a traditional public function was not to draw fine
distinctions among governmental functions, but to find out whether
the preference was for the benefit of a government fulfilling
governmental obligations or for the benefit of private interests,
favored because they were local., 423  Justice Souter explained,
"[u]nder United Haulers, governmental public preference is
constitutionally different from commercial private preference, and we
make the governmental responsibility enquiry to identify the
beneficiary as one or the other. 4 24 He continued, "[b]ecause this is
the distinction at which the enquiry about traditional governmental
activity is aimed, it entails neither tautology nor the hopeless effort to
pick and choose among legitimate governmental activity that led to
Garcia," in which a distinction between traditional and nontraditional
government functions was rejected as unworkable.425 Justice Souter's
footnote not only responded to Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
in Davis, but also addressed questions raised by Justice Alito's dissent
in United Haulers, which Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion in
that case failed to answer.
Justice Souter's footnote does not completely explain how the
Court would apply the traditional versus nontraditional distinction in
a way that avoids the definitional issues which led to its rejection in
Garcia. Nevertheless, he suggests the key to the problem in the
context of the DCCD is for a court to ask whether a provision serves
genuine public purposes or is a mere subterfuge for assisting local
businesses at the expense of out-of-state competitors. Implicitly, he
suggests that the Court looks at whether an activity is a "traditional"
government function not to measure how many years governments
have engaged in such activities, but to aid the court in determining if
the government is acting for a genuine public purpose. If a
422. Id.
423. Id. at 1810 n.9 (majority opinion).
424. Id.
425. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
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municipality is engaging in a traditional activity such as waste
collection, it is more likely its goals are public in nature. Conversely,
if a municipality is engaging in a nontraditional activity such as
running the hypothetical public hamburger monopoly discussed in
United Haulers,426 it may be more likely that it is a subterfuge for
improper purposes like promoting local business interests. If a court
simply uses the traditional versus nontraditional dichotomy as a
helpful factor in understanding whether a law has a legitimate or
illegitimate purpose under the DCCD, it can minimize the
definitional problems raised in Garcia. A court that uses tradition as
a limited factor in its decision about whether a public monopoly
serves a legitimate public purpose does not have to resolve all of the
historical line drawing issues raised in Garcia. Souter's footnote only
provides a brief description of how courts should address the question
of which government activities are entitled to be reviewed under the
more generous Pike test rather than the more stringent per se
standard. Nevertheless, future courts should expand upon his
analysis to develop a more complete methodology for deciding
whether a public monopoly is legitimate under the DCCD. Souter's
footnote offers a better starting point for that analysis than simply
asking whether an activity is traditional or nontraditional in the
historic sense.
Conclusion
In Carbone, the Court adopted a "market access" interpretation
of the DCCD, placing free market economics above federalist
principles which preserve state and local authority to use police
power to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.4 27 The
Carbone decision failed to appreciate that the environmental benefits
of the Clarkstown flow control scheme could not be easily replicated
through the alternative measures of regulation, bonds, or additional
taxes it suggested as a substitute.428 Although they gave Congress the
authority to remove trade barriers between states, the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to elevate free market principles over all
other provisions in the Constitution, including its federalist
426. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. (United
Haulers), 550 U.S. 330, 345 n.7 (2007).
427. See supra Parts II.A, II.D.
428. See supra Parts II.C-D.
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structure.429  The Carbone decision's expansive market access
interpretation of the DCCD threatened to invalidate any state or
local law that might impede in some way the operation of private
business, even if there was no geographical discrimination between
local and out-of-state firms. 3° Like the discredited Lochner decision,
the Carbone Court's free market approach to the DCCD was
inconsistent with the Constitution's federalist structure and the
essential police power responsibilities of states and local governments
to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.43'
The United Haulers decision corrected the excesses of the
Carbone decision. United Haulers correctly distinguished between
laws that create a public monopoly, but treat all private firms the
same regardless of their geographical location, from laws favoring
local businesses at the expense of out-of-state firms.432 The Court
appropriately concluded the former type of law is not per se
discrimination and should be reviewed by courts pursuant to the more
lenient Pike test.4 33 The Court observed that the purpose of public
monopolies is often to serve important public interests, and
concluded the challenged ordinances in fact served environmental
goals such as recycling and waste minimization.434 Furthermore, the
decision properly emphasized that the law imposed most of its costs
on local residents and had only theoretical impacts on interstate
435
commerce.
One aspect of the United Haulers decision was potentially
troubling for future DCCD decisions. Chief Justice Roberts' majority
opinion suggested that courts should apply a more lenient review of
the challenged ordinances because waste disposal is a traditional local
government function.436 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito
argued that the Court had twice adopted a distinction between
traditional and nontraditional local government functions, but then
overruled both decisions because it was unable to develop a workable
test to distinguish between what is traditional and what is
429. See supra Parts I.A, II.D.
430. See supra Parts II.C-D.
431. See supra Parts II.C-D.
432. See supra Parts III.C.3, V.A.
433. See supra Part III.C.4.
434. See supra Part III.C.4.
435. See supra Part III.C.4.
436. See supra Part III.C.3.
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nontraditional.437 Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion failed to
respond to Alito's criticism. In Davis, Justice Kennedy's dissenting
opinion criticized the majority in part with an argument similar to
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in United Haulers, that a local
government's use of "traditional" police power authority should not
exempt it from review under the DCCD.38 In a footnote in Davis,
Justice Souter explained that United Haulers' distinction between
traditional and nontraditional local government functions was not
intended to require courts to draw arbitrary historical lines. Rather,
its purpose was to distinguish between laws that create a public
monopoly for legitimate public goals while treating all private firms
the same, regardless of geographical location, from laws favoring
local businesses at the expense of out-of-state firms.439
One possible interpretation of Souter's brief footnote is that
whether a practice is traditional or nontraditional is just a starting
point for the central inquiry of whether a law is intended to serve the
public interest without geographical discrimination, or whether it is
alternatively intended to favor local businesses at the expense of out-
of-state firms." A law involving a traditional government function
such as waste disposal may be more likely to serve nondiscriminatory
purposes than a nontraditional law establishing a public monopoly of
hamburger stands, since the latter law is more likely to act as a mask
for an illegitimate purpose, such as favoring one private interest at the
expense of others."' Souter's Davis footnote should be helpful in
future DCCD cases involving public monopolies. With Souter's
clarification, the United Haulers decision strikes the appropriate
balance in DCCD cases between respect for the police power of state
and local governments, and the doctrine's central purpose of
invalidating local laws which discriminate geographically between
local private businesses and out-of-state firms.
437. See supra Part III.E.4.
438. See supra Part IV.B.
439. See supra Part V.C.
440. See supra Part V.C.
441. See supra Part V.C.
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